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ABSTRACT 
 
Two Essay in Labor and Public Economics. (August 2010) 
Noelia Ruth Paez Huaroto, B.S., Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos; M.A., 
Georgetown University; M.S., Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Li Gan 
 
This dissertation studies the effects of female labor market participation on fertility 
spacing in U.S., and the impact of special language programs on academic achievement of 
English language learners in Texas public schools.  
The first essay studies the relationship between labor market participation and 
childbirth spacing.  I construct a simple dynamic discrete-choice model to theoretically 
develop several implications.  My model's key prediction is that while continuously working 
women would like to smooth the stream of children (longer spacing), those who transitorily 
drop out of the labor force would want to do the opposite (shorter spacing).  Empirically 
testing the predictions of the model requires a serious effort to deal with endogeneity of the 
labor market participation around the time of the births.  I propose to use a set of simulated 
marginal tax schedules and unemployment rate as instruments for labor market participation.  
Using National Longitudinal Survey Youth (NLSY) data I find that the current participation 
effect is positive and motivates working women to delay the second birth three to five years, 
while the future participation effect is negative and encourages women who transitorily drop 
out of the labor force due to childbearing to have their second child one to two years earlier.  
 iv 
These participation effects on spacing become stronger with fewer years of education, lower 
non labor income, lower complete fertility, and early motherhood. 
The second essay studies the impact of special language programs on academic 
achievement of English language learners in Texas public schools.  A considerable 
proportion of Hispanic students are classified as English Language Learners (ELL) and 
might have difficulty performing ordinary classwork in English.  There is evidence that 
students designated as ELL are considerably behind the rest of the student population 
with respect to meeting the proficiency requirements under No Child Left Behind.  
Using student-level TAKS testing data and campus-level data for years 2003-2009, I 
study the effects of Bilingual and ESL programs on academic achievement of Texas 
public school students.  Program effects are identified by following achievement gains of 
several cohorts of students across grade, using individual and school fixed effects.  
Results show that academic performance of ELL students improves with bilingual 
program participation.  Bilingual effects on achievements gains in the reading test are 
higher for English language learners (between 0.08 and 0.15 standards deviations); 
bilingual effect in reading is greater than in math; and bilingual effect in sixth grade 
exceeds the bilingual effect in fourth and fifth grades.  There is also evidence that 
changing programs from bilingual to ESL or from bilingual to regular can result in lower 
achievements grades.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
SPACING OF CHILDREN AND FEMALE LABOR MARKET PERFORMANCE 
The time elapsed between two births, or childbirth spacing, has a long-lasting effect on the 
well-being of households and economies.  Shorter childbirth intervals are found to be 
associated with both higher morbidity and mortality rates for both the mother and her 
children (Winikoff 1983; Whitworth and Stephenson 2002)1 and there is also evidence that 
children’s academic achievement and years of schooling are negatively affected by shorter 
spacing (Pettersson-Lidbom and Skogman Thoursie 2007)2.  On the other hand, from a 
macro point of view, longer childbirth spacing is associated with lower total fertility rate.  
Especially for countries where total fertility rate is less than replacement rate, longer spacing 
might end up negatively affecting structure of populations, dependency ratio, growth rate, 
income per capita, and public spending on pensions and health.  
A key factor in determining childbirth spacing in developed countries such as U.S., 
is the mother’s labor market participation.  In fact, spacing and labor market participation are 
often jointly determined.   
__________________________ 
This dissertation follows the style of Journal of Public Economics. 
1 Health studies show that serious consequences such as low birth weight (Rawlings, Rawlings, and Read 1995), 
preterm birth (Basso, Olsen, Knudsen, and Christensen 1998), malnutrition of infants and young children 
(Mozumder  et. al. 2000), and early childhood mortality (Whitworth and Stephenson 2002) are often related to 
short intervals.  
2 Psychological and biosocial studies point out that families that space further apart enjoy the benefits of a 
stronger individual parent-child relationship and less sibling rivalry.  There is also evidence that close spacing 
negatively affects self-esteem of later-born children (Pfouts 1980).   
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This chapter studies the relationship between labor market participation and 
childbirth spacing.  I construct a simple dynamic discrete-choice model to theoretically 
develop several implications.  My model's key prediction is that while continuously working 
women would like to smooth the stream of children (longer spacing), those who transitorily 
drop out of the labor force would want to do the opposite (shorter spacing).  Empirically 
testing the predictions of the model requires a serious effort to deal with endogeneity of the 
labor market participation around the time of the births.  I propose to use a set of simulated 
marginal tax schedules and unemployment rate as instruments for labor market participation.  
Using NLSY longitudinal data I find that the current participation effect is positive and 
motivates working women to delay the second birth three to five years, while the future 
participation effect is negative and encourages women who transitorily drop out of the labor 
force due to childbearing to have their second child one to two years earlier.  These 
participation effects on spacing become stronger with fewer years of education, lower non 
labor income, lower complete fertility, and early motherhood. 
Labor market decisions and fertility are two important aspects of the female life 
cycle.  Fertility decisions affect current and future labor market performance of women 
because childbearing represents an economic and time cost for the mother.  Labor 
withdrawal with the purpose of childbearing imposes several types of costs such as a direct 
opportunity cost of foregone earnings, a loss of experience on which future wage growth 
may be conditioned, and a depreciation of the accumulated human capital.  It is also possible 
that women who return to the labor force after a childbearing break may suffer a reduction in 
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their returns to experience (Mincer and Polachek, 1974; Montgomery and Trusell, 1986; 
Miller, 2005). 
Fertility behavior is also affected by the labor market.  Labor market conditions and 
institutions affect fertility through rigidity to entry-exit, instability of contracts, and 
maternity leave policies.  Women who are already committed to professional activities or 
who look forward to pursuing a career may find it challenging to decide their optimal timing 
for childbearing.  In developed countries, a considerable proportion of women are part of the 
labor force.  It is a fact that in those countries, women not only have fewer children but also 
delay the births more often than some decades ago.  Ward and Butz (1980) show that all 
economic events—such as an increase in the woman’s current wage—may affect both 
current demand and future demand for children.  Miller (2005) observes that fertility delay 
has been increasing with female education, labor force participation, and earnings in the U.S. 
since the post-war baby boom.  Figure A-1 shows trends of female labor force participation 
and total fertility rate3 for U.S. during the period 1954-2006. 
Individuals take into account trade-offs between children and labor market 
performance.  Women who eventually want to start a family and do anticipate economic 
consequences of childbearing may change their behavior in the labor market.  They may 
choose to take only part-time jobs or positions that do not require high responsibility or a 
lengthy workweek. 
One way to deal with endogeneity of fertility and labor market participation is by 
using dynamic models.  Wolpin (1984) studies life cycle fertility within an environment 
__________________________ 
3 Total fertility rate represents the number of children that would be born to a woman if she were to live to 
the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance with current age-specific fertility rates. 
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where infant survival is uncertain.  Using Malaysian household data he finds that the 
replacement effect –the reaction to a realized infant death—is small.  Then the survival 
uncertainty or probability of death would not affect the spacing decision.4  Hotz and Miller 
(1988) examine household fertility and female labor supply over the life cycle.  They 
analyze how maternal inputs, market expenditures on offspring, and the benefits children 
yield their parents vary with ages of offspring and influence female labor supply and 
contraceptive behavior.  Using PSID data they find that even when the timing of births is not 
perfectly controlled, parents have a contraceptive strategy over their lifetimes and that 
variations in child care costs do affect the life cycle spacing of births. 
Hyslop (1999) analyzes intertemporal labor force participation behavior of married 
women.  He estimates probit models using maximum simulated likelihood.  He finds that 
participation decisions are characterized by significant state dependence, unobserved 
heterogeneity, and negative serial correlation in the error component.  The participation 
response of women is more strongly related to permanent than to current non labor income.  
Francesconi (2002) estimates a dynamic model of fertility and work of married women. 
Using a sample of married women from National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) of Young 
Women, 1968-1991, he finds that short work interruptions may be more convenient than 
part-time experience during childbearing/childrearing because this part-time experience 
substantially depresses the earnings profile of women.  He also finds that continuously 
married women are remarkably similar to ever-married women in their labor market and 
fertility behavior. 
__________________________ 
4 She uses indicators for first pregnancy ending in miscarriage, first pregnancy while using contraception, 
and years from first attempt to conceive to first birth. 
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Few studies of spacing behavior are found in economics.  Much attention has been 
directed to complete fertility and lifetime timing of offspring (Hotz and Miller 1988; 
Francesconi 2002).  However, these models that fully characterize fertility sometimes 
disregard the importance of early fertility behavior in determining the remainder of the 
childbearing experience (Rodriguez et al. 1984).  Subsequent childbearing might be seen as 
the result of decisions made early in the life cycle (Heckman, Hotz and Walker 1985), and 
this is why a key element to understanding fertility behavior is the spacing of the first span.   
This spacing model includes elements of childbearing-raising production, such as 
economies of scale, characteristics of the childcare cost, and a wage function that reflects the 
economic consequences of work interruptions.  I find that both current labor force status and 
expectations about future labor force status affect the optimal spacing.  The current 
participation effect on spacing is positive while the future participation effect is negative.  I 
also find that working woman would space more if the amount of time she has to spend with 
each child is high and decreases more slowly with the age of the child.  My results support 
that the out-of-home childcare is relatively more important to a woman who stops working 
because of childbearing and anticipates coming back to the labor force.  I also show that a 
non-working woman prefers to space relatively less when scale economies are strong and 
when the effect of leisure on utility is low. 
The approach in this paper is similar to Heckman and Walker (1990), who apply 
dynamic models to obtain several testable hypotheses and use reduced form models to 
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empirically test them5.  By using instrumental variables I deal with the bidirectional causal 
effect of spacing and participation.  Previous literature on fertility had used IVs to test the 
effects of fertility on female labor market outcomes, for example whether the number of 
children affects participation, earnings, and hours worked.  Angrist and Evans (1998) use 
parental preferences for a mixed sibling-sex composition to estimate the effect of 
childbearing on labor supply.  Miller (2005) studies the effect of motherhood timing on 
female labor market performance.  She uses random and unanticipated factors that drive a 
difference between actual and desired timing of motherhood.  I use an IV approach to test 
the other direction of the relationship: whether labor market behavior affects fertility 
outcomes.  The simulated marginal tax schedule I used as an instrument is also found in a 
very recent working paper (Powell 2009) which estimates the value of a statistical life (VSL) 
by using tax schedule as an instrument for occupational risk.  Occupational risk is also a 
labor decision made by individuals and it is endogenous to his problem similar to the way in 
which labor force participation is endogenous to the problem.  
Other macro and demographic concerns support the necessity of the study of spacing 
as it has economic consequences for the structure of the population, dependency ratio, 
growth rate, income per capita, and public spending on pensions and health.  The U.S. 
fertility rate has been stable for the last twenty years (Figure A-1) and is almost as high in 
2006 as it was in 1972.  This fact contrasts the changes in labor market participation, which 
has dramatically increased 40 percent from 1972 to 2006.  In an August 2009 report from 
__________________________ 
5 They study which aspects of life cycle fertility, if any, are sensitive to male income and female wages.  Using 
Swedish longitudinal data they find that economic variables affect both the timing and desired levels of births.  
While female wages play a strong role in fertility dynamics, male income is important only for the first birth. 
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the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Mathews and Hamilton document 
important trends in fertility patterns of women in U.S.  The average age at first birth has 
steadily increased in all states and ethnic groups.  Changes from 1970 to 2006 are quite 
considerable: 3.6 years, from 21.4 to 25 years.  Even though the U.S. had the youngest 
average age at first birth in both periods, it ranked near the middle of all developed countries 
in term of changes.  Average age at first birth from 1970 to 2006 in other developed 
countries ranged between 2.9 (Sweden) and 4.6 (Denmark).  This delaying of the first birth 
has serious consequences in the pattern of cumulative fertility up.  In a recent U.S. Census 
Bureau report, Jane Dye documents that women near the end of childbearing years, 40 to 44 
years old in 2006, had an average of 1.9 children.  Women of the same age thirty years ago 
had 3.1 children on average.  As a result there was a decline in the number of women having 
three or more children from 59 percent in 1976 to 28 percent in 2006.  Also, since most 
women end up with at least one child (more than 80 percent of 40-44 years old in June 2006 
in U.S.), the subsequent childbearing, two or more children, is what makes a difference in 
terms of fertility behavior among countries. 
This study contributes to both the fertility literature and the labor market literature.  
Most importantly, what I accomplish gives new insight to the analysis of endogenous 
fertility that has implications for female labor supply.  This paper also contains several 
policy implications regarding labor market, fertility, health, and demography.  The study of 
spacing decisions contributes to the analysis of the effect of incentives designed by policy 
makers to affect both childbirth spacing behavior and female labor supply. 
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SPECIAL LANGUAGE PROGRAMS AND ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT 
As established by the Texas education code, public schools are responsible for providing 
a full opportunity for all students to become competent in speaking, reading and writing, 
and comprehending the English language, which is the basic language of the state.  A 
student of limited English proficiency (ELL) is a student whose primary language is 
other than English and whose English language skills are such that the student may have 
difficulty performing ordinary class work in English.  Bilingual education and English as 
a second language (ESL) programs were created to meet the needs of those students. 
Although there are several bilingual program models, the main feature of 
bilingual education is to provide instruction for all subjects in school through two 
different languages:  English and a minority language (e.g. Spanish).  In contrast, a 
program of instruction in ESL is intensively in English from teachers trained to 
recognize and deal with language differences.  Other differences among programs are 
related in terms of other academic goals, participating students, and number of years 
students are expected to remain in the program. 
Bilingual and ESL programs partly explain differences in academic achievement 
of ELL students but challenges arise as other observed and unobserved individual and 
school characteristics confound program effects.  There is also a potential selection 
problem as programs participation is correlated with other factors that might affect 
achievement.  From the demand side, parental approval is necessary for children’s 
program participation, and motivations that drive parents to either accept or reject 
language services can also be considered as inputs to children’s academic performance.  
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From the supply side, ELL classification and program availability might differ by school 
districts in ways that may be correlated with academic performance.   
I identify bilingual and ESL program effects by following three cohorts of 
students across grades controlling for students, school and year-by-grade fixed effects.  
Comparisons of academic performance after exit ELL status and/or special language 
programs provide evidence of program effects.  
Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2002) study the effectiveness of special education 
program in raising achievement of special education students and the potential effects of 
this program on academic performance of regular education students.  They use a 
matched panel dataset that combine three successive cohorts of Texas public elementary 
schools, beginning in 1993.  There are three grades of achievement gains for each 
cohort, and time-invariant individual and school fixed effects are considered.  
Transitions into and out of special education allow identification of special education 
effects.  Effects for entrants and exiters are study separately.  They found that the 
average effect of special education for all disabilities is positive. Program effects are 
larger when derived from students entering special education than those who exit.  One 
year of special-education improves performance by 0.1 standard deviations. This 
represents a movement of 3-4 percentile points.  On the other hand, they did not find 
evidence that special education harms achievement of non-special education students 
who share classroom and instruction under mainstreaming system.  A ten percent 
increase in the proportion of students classified as disable raises achievement for 
students not classified as disabled 0.016 standard deviations. 
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Leigh and O’Brien (1998) study the effects of changes to bilingual programs in a 
Texas school district.  They describe and analyze evolution of programs in time and 
study factors affecting students classroom placement (bilingual, ESL, or regular).  Using 
eight years of data for five cohorts of students, this study focuses on the impact of grades 
1-3 program participation on grades 4-5 TAAS scores.  Students participate in different 
combinations of programs in the first three years.  They found that three years in regular 
classroom, or two years in bilingual classroom followed by a year in a bilingual 
classroom, has larger effect on reading achievement than three years in bilingual 
education.  This study acknowledges potential bias in the results because of the problem 
of self-selection.  Inevitably, program assignment is influenced by program availability 
and parental choice.  Moreover, additional challenges arise when several programs are 
available in the school district.  The authors mention they would expect students with 
better English skills would be assigned to ESL or Regular classrooms, while students 
with better native language pre-reading skills would be more likely to be assigned to 
Bilingual classrooms. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE EFFECTS OF LABOR MARKET PARTICIPATION ON FERTILITY 
SPACING 
 
THE BEHAVIORAL MODEL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
In this section I present a discrete dynamic model of female labor market participation and 
spacing of childbirths.  Each woman has a decision horizon of three periods.  Hours of work 
are constant across jobs hence the labor supply choice concerns whether or not to participate.  
Since this is a spacing model the first birth is assumed as given and the fertility decision 
concerns the timing of the second birth6.  
 
The Model 
A. The Timing 
At the beginning of period t=1 a woman gives birth to her first child and chooses whether or 
not to participate in the labor market.  In period t=2 she chooses whether or not to work, and 
whether or not to have her second birth.  The choice made at this second period characterizes 
childbirth interval.  If she has her second childbirth in the second period I say she has chosen 
a short spacing.  The choice of no second birth in this period corresponds to the notion of 
delaying the second birth also known as long spacing.  In period t=3 the participation 
decision is also available, but there is no fertility choice:  If the woman delayed the second 
__________________________ 
6 The study of spacing focuses on women who already have at least one child.  
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birth in the previous period she will have the second child at the current period.  See Figure 
A-2. 
Figure A-3 shows this three-period model as a tree featuring all possible paths a 
woman could follow.  Starting from an initial state in the period t=1, a woman faces a 
sequence of sets of states S1, S2 where St represents the set of states at any particular time 
period t.  Any node on the tree represents a particular state at a particular time, i.e. st  St. 
 
B. The Optimization Problem 
Every woman maximizes her lifetime utility.  For simplicity, I assume an inter-temporal 
separable utility function.  Instantaneous utility is linear and additive, and depends on goods 
consumption and leisure time.  Previous studies on fertility, such as Wolpin (1984), have 
assumed that utility—or services parents receive from existing children—are age-invariant, 
i.e., they only depend upon the number of existing children.  Since in this spacing model two 
children will be born to each woman, I assume utility depends on permanent—as opposed to 
current—number of children7.   
Instantaneous utility is as follows: 
  1),(   Nflcu ttt     (1) 
where ct  and lt  are consumption and leisure respectively, at time t .  N is permanent number 
of children, homogeneous across women. 
__________________________ 
7 This assumption is just to simplify the model.  The first child is born in the first period and the only fertility 
difference among women is the spacing of the second child (with respect to the first).  This spacing is either 
short or long.  As a result, there is small variation in current number of children each period. 
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If she participates in the labor market, she earns a wage w.  Besides that income 
source, she perceives an exogenous non-labor income y , representing mostly her husband’s 
income8. 
Equation (3) is the budget constraint.  She spends her total income on consumption, 
and out-of- home childcare cost  tNwD , , if any.  The monetary childcare cost is a function 
of number of children, and reflects the opportunity cost of her time. 
The woman’s lifetime optimization problem is the following: 
    


3
0
3
0
,
)(
t
tt
t
t
t
t
lc
NflcuMax

    (2) 
subject to      


3
0
3
0
,
t
tt
t
tt PwyNwDc     (3) 
and     tchildrentworking lTPT 1     (4) 
As equation (4) states, every woman has one unit of time every period.  Women’s 
units of time are divided among leisure, time with the children, and time in market work.  
Tworking is the amount of time women spend on working, Tchildren is the amount of time spent 
on children caring, and Pt is an indicator variable for participation at period t.  Unlike the 
__________________________ 
8 Participation of men in children production is almost confined to provision of monetary resources.  As 
Heckman and Walker (1990) find, while female wages play a strong role in fertility dynamics, male income is 
significantly important just for the first birth.  Similarly, Wolpin (1984) finds that male income effect on fertility 
is quite small.  
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monetary budget constraint where one individual can borrow and save in every period, the 
time constraint must be satisfied in each period. 
The inclusion of childcare costs in the optimization problem is motivated by 
empirical finding that both the number and age distribution of children are important on both 
labor participation and hours worked (Hotz and Miller, 1988). 
I discuss in detail the childcare cost and the wage function in the following 
subsections. 
 
C. The Childcare Cost 
Bringing up children, or children production, requires more time than a working woman 
could possibly offer.  Therefore, if a woman decides to work she has to spend money not 
only in goods but also in out-of-home childcare services.  It is important to point out that in 
this model, out-of-home childcare services are substitute for mom’s care when she happens 
to be working.  Other potential motivations for buying out-of-home services such as the 
increase of woman’s leisure are beyond the scope of this study, as it is the case when a 
woman completely avoids children caring.9  To be more precise, I assume that a mother 
needs and wants to spend some of her time with their children10. 
In the context of this model, out-of-home childcare is provided by day care 
centers or nursery schools, and the cost depends on the child’s age (Leibowitz, Klerman, 
__________________________ 
9 Surrogacy is not allowed in this model. 
10 2008 results of the American Time Use Survey (Bureau of Labor Statistics) reports that women living in 
households with children under six years old spent an average of 2.55 hours per day providing primary 
childcare to household children (primary childcare is childcare that is done as a main activity, such as 
physical care of children and reading to or talking with children) and 6.8 hours a day caring for household 
children as a secondary childcare activity.  
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and Waite 1992).  Taking care of very young children is usually more expensive because 
one caregiver can handle relatively few young children11.  U.S. States, for instance, 
regulate child care facilities, the number of children per child care worker, the qualifications 
of the staff, and the health and safety of the children (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Occupational Outlook Handbook, 2010-11 Edition).  To ensure that children in child care 
centers receive proper supervision, State or local regulations may require a certain ratio of 
workers to children.12   
I divide the amount of time each child needs into two components:  basic time and 
extra time.  This is linearly expressed as follows: 
     tChild = tA + tB     (5) 
where tA is basic time and tB is extra time. 
The basic time is provided by the mother; it is a child-exclusive time, an input that a 
child needs and cannot be avoided.  One feature of the basic time is that it decreases as the 
child ages13.  When the child is zero-periods old, basic time is equal to a0.  As the child 
grows up, the basic time decreases by a1. 
__________________________ 
11 Babies require more hands-on care, which means that the center must hire more workers to maintain a 
low ratio of childcare providers to children 
12 The ratio varies with the age of the children. For infants (children under 1 year old), child care workers may 
be responsible for 3 or 4 children. For toddler's (children 1 to 2 years old), workers may be responsible for 4 to 
10 children, and for preschool-aged children (those between 3 and 5 years old), workers may be responsible for 
8 to 25 children. However, these regulations vary greatly from State to State.  In before- and after-school 
programs, workers may be responsible for many school-aged children at a time. 
13 Following Hotz and Miller (1988) we assume that intensity of child care in mother’s time—relative to other 
inputs—declines as children age. 
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    tA = a0  - a1 child age     (6) 
where tA >0, a0 ≥ 0, and a1 ≥ 0.  
The extra time is the remaining necessary time, also input for children production.  
This component could either be bought in the market as daycare services or it can be 
provided by the woman with economies of scale.  As I mentioned above, out-of-home 
childcare services consumption come along with working decisions:  If the mother works, 
she have to buy daycare services, and will pay a higher fee the younger the child.  Out-of-
home childcare prices are as follow: 
0 > 1 > 2     (7) 
where t is the monetary cost of sending a t-period-old child to the out-of-home childcare 
center.  
On the other hand, if the mother does not work, she will provide childcare during the 
extra time.  If this is the case, she will benefit from economies of scale as taking care of two 
children is less costly than two times the first child’s care cost.  This condition is expressed 
as follows: 
1st   <  1st+ 2nd   <    21st     (8) 
where 1st  and 2nd   are the first and the second child’s time cost, respectively. 
The lower cost is translated into more hours of leisure or more hours available to work 
in the labor market.   
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D. The Wage Function 
In her making decision process, a woman takes into account her future wage and job 
opportunities.  Those depend on her endogenous accumulated work experience 
(Francesconi, 2002), human capital level, and number of children at every period.  Labor 
market absences for one period or more result in several penalties for a woman in the labor 
market such as foregone wages, lower returns to experience, and a cost associated with the 
depreciation of her human capital. 
I propose a wage function that reflects economic consequences of work interruptions.  
At every period the base wage—wage earned during the last period worked—is affected by 
a depreciation rate (d) if dropping out of the labor market.  Number of periods out of the 
labor force translates into forgone wages and lower returns. 
 
E. Optimal Spacing 
Due to this simple model specification, I am able to calculate lifetime utilities for all 16 
possible paths or cases-scenario.  Tables A-1, A-2, A-3, and A-4 show components of 
lifetime utility.  Table A-5 shows lifetime utilities.  Elements that characterize the model 
are as follow: allocation of time between work and children—which ultimately 
determines leisure time, childcare expenditure, labor income, and depreciation rate of 
human capital.  As mentioned in the subsection 2.4, the opportunity cost of childbearing 
is expressed in terms of forgone wages and depreciation of human capital. 
There are three different participation behavior patterns of interest.  The first 
pattern is characterized by non-stop participation.  Women have children, take several 
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months off as part of their maternity leave plan, and come back to work again once their 
leave has ended.  In terms of labor market participation I consider them to be 
continuously working women. 
The second participation pattern is characterized by permanent dropout from the 
labor market due to childbearing.  The first child sets a threshold, and after this threshold 
I do not observe labor market participation. 
The third behavioral pattern is given by women who transitorily drop out of the 
labor force and return after childbearing. 
I combine these three different patterns of participation behavior with different 
patterns of fertility spacing.  I am able to compare lifetime utility of those participation-
spacing combinations and obtain clear conclusions regarding the optimal spacing 
conditional to labor behavior. 
In the following subsections I provide evidence that a continuously working 
woman has incentives to space longer.  On the other hand, a woman who transitorily 
drops out of the labor force has incentives to space shorter. 
 
Implications of the Model 
A. Childbirth Spacing of a Continuously Working Woman 
A non-stop working woman prefers to space longer if and only if her lifetime utility 
derived from a longer spacing is greater than lifetime utility when spacing is shorter, all 
else equal.  
From Figure A-3, longer spacing is preferred to shorter spacing if and only if 
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               (9) 
Plugging lifetime utility’s values of paths 3 and 5 (see Table A-5), it follows that 
longer spacing is preferred to shorter spacing if and only if the following condition 
holds: 
             
                
   
                                     (10) 
Let’s consider the difference between parameters of the basic time function, i.e. 
the amount of time a mother has to spend with each child.  Since this difference is 
exactly the amount of time a one period-old child spend with her mother, I can be certain 
that this difference is greater than zero: 
               (11) 
Plugging (10) into (9), the condition (8) transforms into the following equation: 
         
           
  
                
              
  
 
This equation is equivalent to 
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                
              
  
For simplicity, I specify new variables p,q,r, and s: 
            
  
            
  
              
  
               
  
Then,        .  I can show that  
                        (12) 
By concavity, left hand side of equation (11) is positive.  The right hand side 
     is a negative number since it is the negative of the monetary out-of-home childcare 
cost of caring a two periods-old child.  I conclude that this condition is satisfied. 
This means that a continuously working woman prefers longer spacing to shorter 
spacing.  This conclusion remains unaltered even when monetary childcare cost is zero.  
Therefore, the first hypothesis to be tested is the following: 
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Hypothesis 1:  Women who continue working just after the first birth are willing to wait 
longer to have the second child (i.e. current labor participation is positively related to 
spacing). 
To understand the intuition of this hypothesis, let us consider a working woman. She 
is more affected by the time constraint because she divides her time between children, 
leisure and work.  Even when she does buy childcare services, she still has to spend certain 
amount of time with her children.  I previously assumed that she spends at least certain 
amount of time with each child.  The amount of time depends on her children’s age.  Also, 
working women would like to smooth the stream of children because they are less likely to 
exploit scale economies 
  
B. Childbirth Spacing of a Woman Who Transitorily Drops Out of the Labor Force 
Due to Childbearing 
I study the case where a woman drops out of the labor force when her first child is born, 
and returns to work one period after the birth of her second child.  Childbearing is the 
reason to drop out; therefore the end of childbearing period is also the end of the labor 
market absence. 
To fully understand motivations to space longer or shorter when being out of the 
labor force is a transitory state, we need to take into account two important elements.  
First, the number of periods out of the labor force matters because depreciation of human 
capital depresses potential wages. Second, the number of periods left after childbearing 
matters as we can only observe consequences of this depreciation in future wages.  
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In this model I assumed that the first child is born in the first period. The second 
child is born either in the second period (short spacing) or third period (long spacing).  
When we consider only a three period horizon, we can observe participation in the third 
period only in the case of short spacing.  Unfortunately, for the case of long spacing, it is 
not that simple.  We would observe participation in the fourth period, if it were ever 
considered. 
To overcome this problem I artificially add T periods to this three-period model.  
During these T periods we observe participation because I said women will work after 
childbearing.  If we are to compare lifetime utilities of long-spacing versus short-
spacing, the only difference between these T-period-long-spacing and T-periods-short-
spacing is given by the wage differential due to depreciation.  Shorter spacing means less 
depreciation of human capital, hence higher future wages. 
Shorter spacing is preferred to longer spacing if and only if:  
             
  
                  
  
     (13) 
  
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For simplicity, I specify new variables p,q,r, and s: 
                   
  
                 
  
               
  
                    
  
 
Then shorter spacing is preferred to longer spacing if and only if 
                                          (14) 
I conclude that shorter spacing is more likely to be preferred than longer spacing 
when the horizon after childbearing is long14, the base wage rate is high15, and monetary 
childcare during child’s early years is low.  The depreciation rate makes being out of the 
labor force expensive when T ≥2/(1+d). 
The second hypothesis to be tested is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2:  Women who stop working just after the first birth –and look forward to future 
participation—would want to have the second child as soon as possible (i.e. future 
participation is negatively related to spacing). 
The intuition behind this hypothesis is simple:  Non-working mothers divide their 
time between children and leisure, and are more likely to spend more time with their 
__________________________ 
14 This is more likely for younger women, all else equal. 
15 It is more likely that more educated women will have a higher base wage. 
 24 
children than their working peers.  They could take advantage of scale economies in 
childbearing production hence they have more incentives to close their births. 
One more reason supports the idea of short spacing.  As I assumed, being out of the 
labor force causes a depreciation of human capital.  If these women expect to work 
sometime in the near future, they will try to avoid long periods of time out of the labor 
market. 
 
C. Childbirth Spacing of a Woman Who Permanently Drops Out of the Labor Force 
Due to Childbearing 
Longer spacing is preferred than shorter spacing if and only if 
           (15) 
              
                   
              
 1  2 +(1−2 0+3 1  1  2)  
It is easy to prove that 
                                
                           
By concavity this condition (12) is satisfied.  We conclude that         which 
means that a woman who permanently drops out of the labor force due to childbearing of 
the first child prefers to space longer.  A woman who does not work divides her time 
between time her children and leisure.  Longer spacing means more leisure, which 
ultimately increases her utility. 
 25 
Therefore the third hypothesis to be tested is as following: 
 
Hypothesis 3:  Women who never participated after childbearing space more than those who 
stop working but look forward to returning to the labor force.  
This means that no one has more incentive to space two births close together than 
those women who expect to work in the near future.  There is no longer a trade-off between 
childbearing and participation for continuously non-working women.  There is also an 
incentive to smooth out the leisure time for nonworking women. 
 
THE DATA 
I use the NLSY 1979-2006.  This is a nationally representative sample of 12,686 young men 
and women who were 14-22 years old when they were first surveyed in 1979.  These 
individuals were interviewed annually through 1994 and are currently interviewed on a 
biennial basis.  This survey gathers information in an event history format, in which dates 
are collected for the beginning and ending of important life events. 
Out of 12,686 individuals from the original representative sample, 6,283 correspond 
to female observations and 3,428 correspond to ever married women with at least two 
children, twins cases excluded.  The design of the survey allows us to construct a detailed 
history of each respondent’s fertility and labor market performance. 
Figure A-5 depicts spacing distribution of first and second births and second and 
third births.  Distributions are positive skewed as the mass of the distribution is concentrated 
on shorter spacing values.  The highest frequencies are between one and two-and-a-half 
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years of spacing.  51 percent of women waited less than three years before having the 
second child while 27 percent waited between three to five years.  One feature of interest is 
that shape of the distribution of spacing between first and second child is comparable to the 
distribution between second and third child.  The distribution of time elapsed between the 
second and third birth has more extreme values than the same for first and second births.  
More recurrences are found in either less than 24 months or more than 72 months. 
Most of the work is based on either the full sample of women or one of the two 
subsamples:  ever married women with at least two children, and ever married women with 
two children (see Table A-6). 
The sample of women with two children started their first marriage at age 22 and 
childbearing at age 23.  The number of months between the first and second child is on 
average 47.9 months. 
As for the group of women with at least two children, the average age they began 
marriage and childbearing decreases by 6 and 18 months respectively.  Women who ended 
up bearing several children started marriage and childbearing at a young age.  The spacing 
between the first and second child drops by almost 53 months with respect to the group of 
women with only two children. 
Women with just two children have on average more chances of being ever married, 
having the first child in wedlock and having the second child in a second marriage. They are 
also on average more educated than women with more than two children. 
Participation of these women in the labor market depends on the number of children 
they have and the timing of the births.  Participation of women around the time of the first 
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birth will affect spacing decisions.  On one hand women tend to delay children as they 
represent a cost in the labor market; on the other hand it is possible to make the most of the 
time out of the labor force when there is more than one child and there is a chance of 
exploiting economies of scale. 
Figures A-6 and A-7 depict the percentage of women with two children working at 
least 30 hours a week in the labor market about the time of the first and second birth.  
Women increase their participation during the year before a birth.  The participation rate 
drops as women leave the market due to this birth.  As a few months pass, some women 
return to the labor force.  However, participation rate of women after a birth will 
permanently decrease by one-fourth.  Changes in participation are very dramatic when it is 
the first birth (as opposed to the second birth), and also when woman will just have two 
children (as opposed to at least two children).   As a general observation women who will 
end up with more than two children behave differently than women who will just have two 
children, even before childbearing.  Their participation in the labor market is lower, before 
and after children.  This appears to be consistent to Mincer’s finding that women who expect 
to spend less time in the labor force are discouraged from investing in working experience 
and human capital. 
Tables A-7 and A-8 show spacing of children according to women’s behavior in the 
labor market.  Women who always work wait around 51 months to have their second 
child16.  In contrast, women who never participate space their children 37 months.  Other 
__________________________ 
16 Spacing’s means remain relatively unaltered when definition of participation changes.  Tables 7-10 
define participation as working at least 30 hours a week during one month (Table 7), two months (Table 
8), three months (Table 9), four (Table 10) or five months (Table 11). 
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lifecycle participation patterns are also relevant to this analysis.  The longest overall spacing 
is found among women that entered to the labor force after childbearing and continuously 
worked since then.  They space their children on average 64 months apart.  The shortest 
spacing is found among women who permanently dropped out of the labor force due to 
childbearing.  On average they waited just 28 months before having the second child. 
 
THE EMPIRICAL STRATEGY  
I test the hypotheses regarding spacing and expect spacing to be positively affected by 
current participation and negatively affected by future participation.  As I argued above, a 
woman who wants to continue working in the labor market will try to space more her 
childbirths in order to have more time available to work in the labor market.  In contrast, a 
woman who has already left the labor force due to childbearing of the first child, and expects 
to return in the future, would want to space less in order to reduce the impact of economic 
penalties due to longer labor market interruptions. 
I use instrumental variables to analyze the effect of participation on childbirth 
spacing.  A longitudinal set of simulated marginal tax schedules as well as other macro 
variables that characterize labor market conditions are proposed as instruments for labor 
participation. 
 I observe participation around the time of the first and second birth.  I have 
information regarding the timing—month and year—of first and second birth; and 27 years 
of weekly labor history (1978-2004).   
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First, I construct several indicator variables representing current and future 
participation.  Current and future are two terms that characterize the timing of participation 
into fertility stages.  There are three important fertility stages regarding the first child: 1) the 
period of time before the childbirth; 2) the childbearing period; and, 3) the period of time 
after childbearing.  I define the childbearing period as the period that includes the last stage 
of pregnancy, the birth, and early nursing period.  See Figure A-4.   
A great proportion of women do not work during this childbearing period, but once 
this period has passed several women gradually return to work.  I allow few months of 
childbearing according to what will be considered as a maternity leave period.  Figures A-6 
and 7 depict the pattern of participation around the time of the first birth and second birth.  
According to the observation of the data, I define the childbearing period as two months 
before the birth, plus four months after the birth.  If women are not working during this 
childbearing period I will not make any preliminary conclusions regarding their 
participation.  The periods before and after the childbearing period are critical for the 
analysis.  We can conclude that they definitely dropped out of the labor force if we do not 
observe participation after a few months of what it would be considered a maternity leave 
period.  A considerable percentage of women will actually do so.    
Since the key of spacing analysis concerns about the timing of first and second 
births, we need to visualize the second childbearing process as overlapping the first one.  
One childbearing period close to the next one seems to be a good choice for mothers who 
can spend a relatively high amount of time caring their children when they are very young.  
This closer spacing makes the most of the mother’s time when she is out of the labor force, 
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especially if she manages to rear more than one child at a time.  This last scenario is rather 
implausible for a woman who is in the labor force and finds already quite difficult to balance 
childbearing and work. 
I define current participation as participation during childbearing interval—the 
period of time between the first and the second birth.  I define future participation as 
participation after childbearing period of the second child.  Since we have both fertility and 
labor force histories of women, we can observe whether she works before, during, and after 
childbearing period.  The fact that a considerable number of women do not work before 
childbirth of the first child is explained by both fertility and non-fertility reasons.  As 
mentioned above, a group of women do not work even before childbearing because they 
anticipate future conflict between work and family, which discourage investments and 
accumulation of labor market experience. 
 
The Need for a Simulated Marginal Tax Schedule  
As mentioned earlier, labor participation and fertility spacing are two decisions that affect 
each other simultaneously.  Hence, it is necessary to find instrumental variables that affect 
fertility spacing only through labor market participation. 
The marginal tax rate is the amount of taxes paid on the next dollar earned, the most 
relevant tax rate when making an economic analysis regarding decisions about working, 
saving, and investing.  For example, a worker considering whether to work overtime or to 
take a second job will be most concerned about what percentage of the extra money he will 
earn will be paid in taxes.  This rate has been used to study the behavioral price effects of 
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taxation on topics such as charitable giving, labor supply and sheltering income from 
taxation (Feenberg and Coutts 1993). 
The marginal tax rate depends on individual characteristics, income, and a variety of 
nonlinear deductions, exemptions, and credits17.  State tax regimes differ from federal tax 
structure, and from one another.  They all change in time.  
This marginal tax rate has two features that might harm its chances of becoming a 
suitable instrument for participation.  First, the marginal tax rate depends on income.  
Income is a function of numbers of hours worked, not exogenous to fertility decisions.  I 
explain how I deal with this issue later, when I present the procedure to construct the 
simulated marginal tax rate.  Second, the marginal tax rate has the property of affecting 
fertility through two channels:  Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and 
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).  I explain this relationship below. 
 
A. The Link between AFDC and Fertility 
The largest literature on the fertility impacts of income support programs focuses on Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).  Eligibility for AFDC was contingent upon 
having at least one child with the absence of at least one parent, providing strong incentive 
for an unmarried woman to have her first child.  Welfare seems to have a larger effect on 
fertility for white women than black women.  Beyond the eligibility for AFDC that came 
with the birth of the first child, welfare benefits typically increased with the birth of each 
additional child.   Several papers find that these incremental benefits have no effect on the 
__________________________ 
17 Childcare credits, rent credit, property tax credit, general credits, various elderly and pension credits, 
etc. 
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probability of additional births, conditional on having at least one child (Fairlie and London 
1997). 
Gogger and Bronars (2001) find no relationship between incremental welfare benefits 
and the timing of subsequent births.  However, there seems to be a relationship between base 
welfare generosity and subsequent fertility for initially unwed black mothers.  Due to the 
welfare cap benefits are denied for children born while their mothers are receiving welfare. 
 
B. The Link between EITC and Fertility 
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) may encourage childbearing (Baughman and 
Dickert-Conlin, 2006).  Expansions in the EITC at the state and federal levels 1980s and 
1990s led to an increase in the birth rate among targeted low-skill families.  However, 
expanding the credit produced only extremely small reductions in higher order fertility18 
among white women.  In any case, higher levels of the EITC are associated with higher first 
birth rates among married women and lower first births among unmarried women.  EITC 
encouraged marriage among single women. 
On the other hand Hotz, Mullin and Scholz (2006) examine the effect of the EITC 
on the Labor market participation of families on welfare, and assume the presence of a child 
is exogenous to the value of the EITC. 
 
 
 
__________________________ 
18 Three children or more 
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C. Simulated Marginal Tax  Schedule 
As mentioned above actual marginal tax rate is a function of income, which is a function of 
wages and hours worked.  Wages are exogenous to our problem, but number of hours 
worked is a decision based on taxes and current number of children.  At the same time, 
various welfare and credits are children related, and this would disqualify the simulated 
marginal tax schedule as a suitable instrument if not taken into account. 
I use NBER’s TAXSIM19 program to calculate marginal tax schedule series.  I 
propose the following procedure to capture non-fertility individual characteristics, and 
variations in federal and state laws across states and years.  
 
1. Construct three time series of simulated income for each individual.  Rather than 
using actual number of hours worked—which varies by individual at different tax 
schedules and current number of children—I use actual wages and three 
homogeneous number of hours worked patterns:  zero hours worked, twenty hours 
worked and forty hours worked, a week.  This simulated income series will be used 
as the gross income needed to calculate simulated marginal tax schedule. 
2. Calculate taxable income subtracting deductions and exemptions that do not provide 
fertility incentives.  Also, income after credits must just include non-fertility credits 
(no EITC). 
3. Calculate marginal tax schedules for each individual using federal and state tax 
schedule. 
__________________________ 
19 TAXSIM is a set of programs for calculating liabilities under US Federal and State Income tax laws from 
individual data.  Its utilization allows us to correct after-tax prices for models of economic behavior 
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4. Average rates according to stages of fertility lifecycle: before the first birth, during 
childbirth interval, and after the second birth.   
 
Inputs used were tax year, state, and marital status; and all taxable simulated income 
that comes from wages, business and self employment of taxpayer and spouse.  I assume 
single women file as single while married women filed as joint (marital status does change 
in time).  Since there are three homogeneous patterns of hours worked and three stages of 
fertility lifecycle each individual ends up with nine sets of simulated marginal tax schedule 
outcomes at different period.  
The set of variables I use as instruments then includes effective federal marginal rate, 
effective state marginal rate, federal and state income tax liability, FICA, and FICA rate (all 
variables are over time).  The average of these variables around the time of the first and 
second birth serves as instruments for current and future participation.  See descriptive 
statistics of in Tables A-9, A-10 and A-11. 
 
Empirical Specifications  
I estimate the effect of labor market current participation (cp) and future participation (fp) on 
first span fertility spacing. 
                                      (16) 
As pointed out in previous sections, current and future participation are defined as 
working during the childbirth interval and after the second birth, respectively.  Following the 
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main results from the theoretical model, I expect current participation to positively affect 
spacing (    ) and future participation to negatively affect it (    ). 
Several control variables are considered.  I expect that women who start childbearing 
at an older age will feel pressured to space their children closer because their fertility horizon 
is shorter.  Marital status, before and after the first birth, imposes restrictions on the timing of 
the second birth.  Variables characterizing education and wealth will also affect fertility 
decisions as the income effect induces individuals to have more children.  Since this is a 
study of the timing of the second birth, labor market circumstances of women after the first 
birth are relevant to determine the opportunity cost and substitution effect of an increase in 
the number of children from one to two.  A vector of controls (  ) includes age at first birth, 
indicator for marriage before birth, indicator for second birth during the second marriage, 
among others. 
A second specification deals with the fact that future participation behavior is 
actually conditional on current participation status.  Two women might have the same 
expectation about coming back to the labor force in the future, but the one who transitorily 
dropped out of the labor force due to childbearing has much more incentive to space her 
births closer together.  As mentioned earlier, being out of the labor force for a shorter period 
of time reduces economic penalties such as depreciation of human capital. 
I estimate the effect of future participation conditional on non-participation in the 
current period. 
                                             (17) 
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I expect    to be negative because future participation motivates women to space 
shorter. I also expect that       because the future participation effect will be stronger for 
women who transitorily drop out than for women who currently work. 
Also, I identify the effects of labor force participation on spacing for women with 
more years of schooling. 
                                                         (18) 
A different perspective is given by the level of income, but since female income is 
endogenous to our problem I consider husband’s income instead. 
                                                   (19) 
Interactions of variables that characterize fertility are also considered.  I test whether 
women who were relatively young at the time of the first birth will delay the second child 
more often than older women, as their fertile horizon is longer.   
                                                         (20) 
At the same time, complete fertility plays a role because women who desire to have more 
than two children might decide shorter childbirth spacing than those women who will want 
to have just two kids.  The spacing equation including number of children becomes as 
follows 
                                                (21) 
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where N is the number of children. 
 Since number of children is endogenous I use as an instrumental variable the mixed 
sibling sex-composition proposed by Angrist and Evans (1998). 
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CHAPTER III 
THE IMPACT OF BILINGUAL AND ENGLISH AS A SECOND LANGUAGE 
PROGRAMS ON ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
LEARNERS 
 
IDENTIFICATION OF ELLS AND PLACEMENT DECISIONS 
The Texas education agency has established a procedure for identifying school districts 
that are required to offer bilingual education and ESL programs.  If a district or charter 
school has at least one English Language Learner (ELL) student, the district must 
provide ESL services.  On the other hand, the state education agency requires offering a 
bilingual program if there are 20 or more ELL students of the same language 
classification at any one grade level district wide20.  
Each school district that implements a Bilingual or ESL program is required to establish 
and operate a language proficiency assessment committee (LPAC)21. 
Responsibilities of the LPAC are to identify ELL students, make 
recommendations regarding the best instructional setting to place them into, and monitor 
their progress until two years after the student has left the ELL classification.  For the 
ELL identification the LPAC considers the home language survey (HLS), and the 
__________________________ 
20 Each district shall offer: bilingual education in kindergarten through the elementary grades; bilingual 
education, instruction in ESL, or other transitional language instruction approved by the agency in post-
elementary grades through grade 8; and instruction in ESL in grades 9 through 12. 
21 The Bilingual LPAC committee shall have four members: a professional bilingual educator, a 
professional transitional language educator, a parent of a limited English proficiency student, and a 
campus administrator.  The ESL committee membership includes one or more professional personnel 
(campus administrator and/or a certified ESL teacher), and a parent of a ELL student participating in the 
program. 
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performance of the student in two different tests: the English language proficiency test, 
and the proficiency test in the primary language.  Students are classified as ELL if the 
score on the English proficiency test is below the levels established by the agency and/or 
the score on the primary language proficiency test is greater than the score on the 
English test22.  Identification and placement occur within the first four weeks of the 
student enrollment. 
Once identification has been accomplished, LPAC recommends the appropriate 
educational program (ESL/Bilingual) for each ELL student23.  Parental approval is 
required24.  The student’s parent must approve the student’s entry into the program, exit 
from the program, and placement in the program.  If a parent denies the placement 
decision, then the student is identified in the public education information management 
system (PEIMS)25 as a ―ELL with a parent denial‖ until the student meets exit criteria 
and the student is then reclassified as non-ELL26. 
The change of ELL to non-ELL status is a school district decision.  In order to 
exit ELL status a student must score advanced (high) in the TELPAS test and also 
should pass the ITBS or TAKS in English.  Additionally evaluations of the student’s 
__________________________ 
22 Grade PK-1 students are identify ELL if their oral language proficiency test (OLPT) in English and 
primary language (for bilingual programs) scores indicate limited English proficiency.  Grades 2-12 
students are identified ELL if OLPT does not meet the criteria necessary condition; and/or if they score 
below the 40th percentile on the reading and/or language arts sub-test of the state-approved norm-
referenced standardized achievement test (even if their OLPT score indicates English proficiency). 
23 Placement depend on: Bechmarks, tests (TAKS, ITBS, SAT, Oral language proficiency, etc), grades, etc  
24 Parental notification includes information regarding the English proficiency level of the student and a 
description of the program as well as the benefits of the program. 
25 The public education information management system (PEIMS) is the system used to report to the state 
the progress of ELL students. 
26 The date that the parent notification form is signed is the date the student’s official status becomes ELL, 
regardless of permission or denial. 
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teacher and parents opinions might also count.  Students who are at lower grades and 
therefore not taking TAKS tests should score 40% or above in the reading agency 
approved norm-referenced standardized achievement test.  Students exit out the 
Bilingual or ESL program if the student is able to participate equally in a regular all 
English instruction program as determined by meeting the standards of assessments27.   
Students in Pre-K and Kindergarten may not exit from a bilingual education or 
ESL program and in general ELL students cannot be reclassified as non-ELL at these 
grade levels. 
One important role of LPAC is to ensure that exit decisions are appropriate for 
students as reclassification as ELL and re-entry to a bilingual or ESL program is not 
recommended by the agency. 
Once LPAC reclassifies a student as non-ELL parents will be notified and the 
student will be monitored for two years 
As described above, ELL status is determined by an assessment of the current 
state of English and primary language skills.  While this assessment process is grounded 
in objective measures of language proficiency, there are subjective and, possibly, 
strategic factors that could influence the school’s classification decisions.  There are 
potential supplier selection issues associated with ELL designation.  
Participation in the ESL/Bilingual programs is also subject to the parents 
preferences.   Since the final decision is made by the parents, participation in the 
__________________________ 
27 Oral (agency approved English OLPT), reading /ELA (Norm Referenced Achievement Test or English 
TAKS test) and writing (TELPAS Advanced High or English TAKS test). 
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bilingual or ESL programs have an intrinsic endogenous character.  Self-selection issues 
arise from the nature of choices made by parents, and make the analysis of the impact of 
several variables on student’s performance difficult to disentangle. 
Even though identification of ELLs as well as program recommendations to 
those students follows a general procedure established by Texas Education Agency, the 
implementation of this procedure might differ by district.  Districts might face incentives 
to either expand the population of ELL students or to reduce the population according to 
not only student’s characteristics but also own district and schools’ characteristics.  The 
number of ELLs in the school district is a key variable to determine if the district must 
offer special language programs and what type of programs.  Districts with at least one 
ELL student must offer ESL instruction to those students.  But if the district has at least 
20 students in the same grade and language classification, then the district is obliged to 
implement a bilingual program.  Also, participation in Bilingual and ESL programs is 
one necessary condition to qualify for ELL-exception from the TAKS assessment.  Then 
the district might have incentives to implement and recommend special language 
programs to target students, especially if they are low-performing students, as results of 
TAKS are important for school and districts in determining rating classification.  
 
TEXAS ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEM 
Students in Texas public schools take standardized state-specific tests.  The intent of the 
standardized tests is to assess students’ attainment of the knowledge and skills at each 
tested grade level as required by the education standards articulated in state academic 
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objectives guidelines.  Relevant to my research, eligible students may take a Spanish 
version of the state test.  This option is available in mathematics at grades 3-6, in reading 
at grades 3-6, in writing at grade 4, and in science at grade 5. 
The tests are scored as scale scores, with the scaling offering comparability of 
exams for the same grade level across test administrations.  The scores are not, however, 
vertically aligned across grade levels. 
Student performance on the statewide tests is a key determinant of the 
accountability ranking for schools.  The annual report cards for schools assign a rating to 
each campus, with annual state test performance for all students and for several 
subgroups of students (subject to a minimum subgroup size requirement), including 
Hispanic students as a major ranking factor (along with completion rate and dropout 
rate).  The performance standards are set in terms of percentage of eligible students 
passing the test.  Accountability systems built on threshold measures of this type may 
create unintended incentives for schools to focus resources on ―bubble kids‖ (see Reback 
(2008)). 
The LPAC is also responsible for facilitating ELL student’s participation in other 
programs such as special education, when required.  The student is not referred to 
special education unless there is information that indicates a disability. If the ELL 
student does not appear to have any disability, the student will be served by the 
Bilingual/ESL program.  If evidence suggests disability, the student can be served by 
both: the special education program and the bilingual/ESL education program. 
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It is mandatory that a LPAC member be present at the admission, review, and 
dismissal (ARD)28 of any ELL student.  On the other hand, an ARD committee member 
does not need to be present at an LPAC, but it is encouraged to do so.   
 
Test Administration Decision 
In early spring, before the state assessment, LPAC determines the best state testing 
option for each ELL student.  The assessment options are: Administration of the English 
version criterion-referenced test, administration of the Spanish version criterion-
referenced test; or exemption from the criterion-referenced test 29.  In order to make a 
decision, the LPAC considers information of each student: academic program 
participation (bilingual education or ESL) and language of instruction, language 
proficiency in English and/or Spanish, number of years enrolled in U.S schools, previous 
testing history, level achieved in the state reading proficiency test in English (RPTE), 
consecutive years of residence outside the 50 U.S. states, and schooling outside the U.S. 
Most ELL students take TAKS in either English or Spanish.  Exemptions from 
TAKS test focus especially on immigrants students.  Rules are as follow: Spanish TAKS 
may be taken for up to three years of TAKS administrations30, and years of ELL 
exception plus Spanish TAKS may not exceed 3 years.   
 
__________________________ 
28 The admission, review, and dismissal (ARD) committee for special education is the responsible to place 
students into the Special Education program 
29 Exemption is an option for ELL students in grades 3 through 10.  Postponement is also a valid choice 
for students who have to meet the exit requirement. 
30 Years when TAKS is administered (third and after) 
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Bilingual Education Exceptions/Waivers for English as a Second Language 
Districts must report to the TEA the status of their teacher recruitment effort for the 
bilingual education and/or ESL programs. The district must submit at least one of the 
following three forms: Assurance of Bilingual/ESL Program Compliance, Request for 
Exception to the Bilingual Education Program along with the Assurance Form and/or 
Request for Waiver for English as a Second Language Program along with the 
Assurance Form. 
 
Funding of Bilingual and ESL Programs 
Bilingual and ESL programs are funded with federal, state and local funds.  The state’s 
general education fund provides a basic allotment for teachers, textbooks, classrooms, 
etc; and additional funding to implement special language programs.  The Bilingual/ESL 
allotment to school districts is equal to the adjusted basic allotment multiplied by 0.1. 
Title III, Part A provides supplemental resources to local education agencies to 
help ensure ELL and immigrant students meet state achievement performance standards 
though high quality and effective language instruction.  The U.S. Department of 
Education distributes Title III, Part A funds to states based on the number of ELL 
enrolled in the district.  Funding formula that takes into account district size, the number 
of immigrant students and the percentage increase over two years. 
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THE DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
I combine student-level and campus-level data for the years 2003-2009.  The student-
level data consist of the test scores for the subjects of Reading and Mathematics, grades 
3 through 6; and several indicators and demographics for all students in the public 
education system.  I identify bilingual and ESL program effects by following three 
cohorts of students across grades controlling for students, school and year-by-grade 
fixed effects.  Comparisons of academic performance after exit ELL status and/or special 
language programs provide evidence of program effects.   
I divided the cohort of students into two groups:  students who took English 
versions of the test in grades 3 through 6; and students who took Spanish version of the 
test in grades 3-5 and English version in grade 6.  Most students who took Spanish 
version of the test are bilingual program participants; and for most schools, bilingual 
programs do not necessarily have to be offered are in grade 631.  Table B-1 shows the 
samples used in this study.  There are four samples considered:  Reading and 
Mathematics samples of students who took English version of the test (a.k.a. English 
samples);  and Reading and Mathematics samples of students who took Spanish version 
of the test in grades 3-5 and English version of the test in grade 6 (a.k.a. Spanish 
samples). 
 
__________________________ 
31 School districts must provide bilingual program to elementary school children if there is at least 20 ELL 
students in the same grade and language classification. Services can be provided as early as kindergarten 
up to 5th grade.  Also 6th graders must be participants, if services are available in the campus.  
Nevertheless, most ELL exit bilingual program by 5th grade or before.  Most students who take Spanish 
version of the test are bilingual program participants. 
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ELL students in Texas are around 10 percent of the population of students, and the 
vast majority of them are Hispanic (95 percent).  In order to serve the language needs of 
these students, most school districts offer special programs for English Language 
Learners, such as ESL and Bilingual.  For the population in this study, approximately 
half of the Hispanic ELL students attend either bilingual or ESL classrooms.  The other 
50 percent go to regular classrooms.  This proportion of ELL students attending regular 
classrooms—instead of Bilingual or ESL classrooms—is explained by both the demand 
and the supply side: On one hand, parents of students who are offered a special language 
classroom option for their child (bilingual/ESL) may reject the placement and prefer the 
regular classroom.  In other settings the school-districts fail to offer a full set of special 
language services to ELL students.  This last outcome is possible due to the bilingual 
Education exceptions and waivers for ESL. 
The data include information on raw scores and scale scores, and whether or not 
the student counts as passing.  Other indicators and demographics include student’s 
campus, grade, ethnicity, migrant status, and free and reduce lunch qualifications.  Some 
variables describing English language skills and special language program participation 
are: ELL status, ever ELL status, bilingual program and ESL program participation, one 
or two years exited ELL status, and Spanish or English version of the test.  The campus-
level data consist of campus indicators on enrollment and passing rate in reading and 
mathematics of All Students and the following student groups: African American, 
Hispanic, White, and Economically Disadvantaged; and some variables describing 
special language program campus characteristics such as percentage of full time workers 
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serving bilingual an ESL programs.  Table B-2 and Table B-3 show summary statistics 
of the students in all four samples of study.  Raw and scale scores are higher in the 
English samples, for both Reading and Mathematics. Also, the percentage of students 
who met the standard established by the Texas Education Agency is higher for students 
who took English versions of the test (91.7 in Reading and 87.1 in Mathematics).  As we 
observe in Table B-3, almost all students in the Spanish sample are both Hispanic (99.8 
percent for both reading and math samples) and English language learners (98.3 and 97.9 
percents respectively).  The percentage of economically disadvantage students is 
considerably higher in the Spanish samples (71 and 72.2 percent versus 42.5 and 42.7 
percent). 
Table B-4 shows the cohorts of Texas elementary school students who took 
English versions of the Reading test as they progress in school.  Tables B-5 and B-6 
provide information regarding the distribution of ELL students in Texas by classroom 
type and grade level.  Between 42 percent and 45 percent of students receive either 
bilingual or ESL instructions in grades fourth and five.  We observe a dramatic change 
in those percentages in grade 6 as most students must leave bilingual program due to 
unavailability of the program.  On the other hand, most of the students in the Spanish 
sample received bilingual instruction (more than 98 percent) and also most of them had 
to switch to ESL programs as bilingual program became unavailable.  
I use a value-added model that considers grow in achievement or gains in 
achievement as measure of academic performance.  The dependent variable is based on 
one-year improvements in student-level test scores.  Working with gains instead of 
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levels helps controlling for cumulative effects of elements from the past parental and 
school inputs and students abilities.  As measure of academic achievement I use gains in 
standardize scores (mean of zero and variance equal to one), and following Reback’s 
methodology I adjusts for the possibility that one-year differences in test scores might 
signify more or less substantial gains at different points in the test score distribution.  As 
Reback’s procedure indicates, instead of using the difference between the current and 
prior year’s scores, I transform these gains to allow for comparability in improvements 
across the entire test score distribution.  Z-score is based on the performance of students 
with identical prior year’s scores in identical grades.  Each Z-score represents the place 
in the standard normal distribution for the current year’s score based on similar 
performance in the prior year.  One may interpret a coefficient estimate as how the 
independent variables relates to achievement gains ―compared to typical gains at this 
place in the test score distribution‖ 
 I estimate several variations of the following model: 
 
                         
    
                         (1) 
 
 This equation models achievement gains for student i in grade g and school s at 
time t as a function of paths regarding ELL status and Bilingual and ESL participation in 
periods t-1 and t as shown in Table B-7; vector of individual (X) and school (W) 
characteristics; and four error components: individual factor (   , school fixed effects 
(   , school-by-grade-by-year fixed effects (    ), and a random error (     ) . 
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 Individual characteristics include ethnicity, migrant status and economically 
disadvantage status. The vector of school characteristics includes mobility percent, 
enrollment count, percent of students in bilingual education programs, percent of 
economically disadvantaged students, percent of ELL students, and proportions of black, 
Hispanic, and white students. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
ESTIMATION OF EFFECTS OF LABOR MARKET PARTICIPATION ON FERTILITY 
SPACING 
I estimate the effect of current and (conditional and unconditional) future participation on 
fertility spacing. 
Tables A-12, A-13, and A-14 show the first-stage regressions of instruments on past 
experience, current participation, and future participation respectively.  Since left-hand side 
participation is discrete, I use logit estimations to predict probabilities of being in the labor 
force.  The instrumental variables used are contemporaneous for past participation, and 
contemporaneous and past for current and future participation.  Eight different specifications 
are used.  Husband’s income is measured by permanent income from wages and other 
sources, and by transitory income around the time of the births. 
Table A-15 shows results using OLS estimation, but since participation is 
endogenous I expected these results to be biased.  Current participation increases spacing by 
15 months, while the effect of future participation is almost negligible as it decreases spacing 
in less than one month.  Working labor experience also decreases spacing, and the effect 
seems to be stronger than future participation.    
Instruments that are significant for current participation are FICA rate, simulated 
federal income tax liability when she works part-time (20 hours), and contemporaneous 
simulated effective state and federal marginal tax schedules.  Instruments significant for 
future participation are unemployment rate before and after childbearing, federal income tax 
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liability before childbearing, simulated effective state marginal tax schedule before second 
birth, FICA rate before and after births, and contemporaneous federal tax rate. 
 The second stage shows the effects of participation on spacing.  I consider two 
variations for the second stage.  In the first, I control for number of children ever, as it is 
observed that women who end up with more children at the end of the fertility horizon 
tended to space them closer.  In the second variation, I acknowledge the fact that number of 
children is endogenous to the problem; thus I use and instrument for number of children.  
The instrument used is the Angrist and Evans (1998) mixed sibling-sex composition. 
Table A-15 shows the results when I use the first variation (i.e. controlling for 
number of children) and different controls and specifications for first stage.  Results 
regarding current and future participation on spacing confirm conclusions found in our 
theoretical model.  Women who work increase their spacing (positive sign), while women 
who expect to work in the future decrease their spacing (negative sign).  I present evidence 
that working women delay the second child in a magnitude that varies between 49 and 54 
months.  Future participation has a smaller impact but is still important.  Women who expect 
to work in the future will want to decrease their spacing by one year magnitude.  Present and 
the future participation play opposite effects in determining the optimal spacing between the 
first and second child.  Present conditions seem to be more relevant. 
When I use an instrument for number of children ever, I find a positive current 
participation effect and a negative future participation effect.  Women who participate in the 
labor market increase their spacing by 53 to 57 months, while women who expect to work in 
the future decrease their spacing by 13 months.  These results that account for endogeneity 
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in number of children—as opposed to ignoring the endogeneity—give same effects to future 
participation and less variation in the effects of current participation.  
Table A-18 tests robustness to changes in husband’s income.  Instead of using a 
proxy for permanent income as I did in Table A-15, I use now a proxy to transitory income, 
by looking at the income around the time of first and second births.  Once again women 
space longer when currently working and shorter when they intent to participate in the labor 
market in the future.  Current participation increases spacing by 49 to 62 and future 
participation decreases spacing by 12 to 30 months. 
Thus far I have discussed results concerning unconditional future participation; i.e., 
when there is no previous condition regarding current participation status.  However it is 
interesting to know how the future effect changes—in terms of sign and magnitude—for 
women who transitorily drop out of the labor force due to childbearing.  I said earlier that 
this group of women must have stronger incentives to space their children closer together.  
Table A-16 shows the first stage for variable ―future participation given no current 
participation.‖  Instruments that are significant here are contemporaneous and past FICA 
rate, effective state marginal rate during childbirth interval, federal income tax liability 
during child interval, effective state marginal rate, and several interactions of these variables. 
As for the second stage, the effect of current participation on spacing is still positive, 
although magnitude is smaller than in previous regressions (33 to 39 months).  On the other 
hand, the future participation effect was never as big as it is now (22 to 23 months).  This 
supports the idea that conditional on not working in the present, future participation gives 
extra incentives to decrease spacing between the first and second child. 
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When I examine heterogeneity of the effect of labor market participation on spacing 
I find that women with more years of schooling and higher husband’s income experience 
weaker current and future labor participation effects on their childbirth spacing (see table A-
17).  The current participation effect for women with more than 12 years of schooling 
decreases by 16 months, and the future participation effect decreases by 31 months.  Women 
with fewer years of schooling increase their spacing by 59 months when they have a 
working status, and decrease their spacing by 32 months when they are not working.  On the 
other hand, women with more years of schooling either increase their childbirth spacing by 
43 (if working) or decrease it by 1 month (if not working). 
Heterogeneity by husband’s income produces comparable results.  Effects become 
stronger for lower income households.  Differences in spacing due to differences in 
transitory income provide evidence on the importance of variations of non-labor income on 
fertility.  When I focus on non-labor income at the time of the first birth, women with higher 
non-labor income (above median) increase their spacing by 40 months if currently working, 
and decrease their spacing by 7 months if not working.  On the other hand, women with low 
non-labor income increase their spacing by 69 months if currently working and decrease 
their spacing by 26 months if not working. 
With respect to heterogeneity of the effects of participation on spacing by complete 
fertility, women with only two children space 62 months longer if currently working, and 20 
months shorter if not working.  Women with more than two children space 33 months longer 
if working and 7 shorter if not working. 
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I also find heterogeneity in the effects of participation on spacing by age of the first 
birth.  Effects are considerably higher for women younger than 25 at the time of first birth, 
followed by women older than 30.  Women who started motherhood between 25 and 30 
experience less intensive effects than the rest of the age groups.  Working women increase 
spacing by 75 months (if age at first birth is less than 20 years old), 53 months (if age at first 
birth is between 21 and 25 years old) or 32 months (if age at first birth is between 26 and 30 
years old).  Women who dropped out of the labor force decrease spacing by 30 months (if 
age at first birth is younger than 20), 14 months (if age at first birth is between 21 to 25 years 
old), or increase spacing by two months (if age at first birth is between 26 to 30 years old).  
Older women (older than 30) experience a current participation effect of 37 months and 
positive future participation effect of 6 months.  This last result is very intuitive as older 
women might prefer relatively shorter spacing as their fertile horizon becomes shorter in 
time. 
 
ESTIMATION OF IMPACT OF BILINGUAL AND ESL PROGRAMS ON 
ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT 
Tables B-8, B-9, B-10, and B-11 show estimations of bilingual and ESL program effects 
by measuring the impact of ELL and program participation paths of three cohorts of 
students across grades, controlling for students, school, and year-by-grade fixed effects.  
Table B-8 uses as reference group the group of students who were non-ELL and 
attended regular classrooms in both t-1 and t periods.  Differentials in paths’ estimations 
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provide evidence of bilingual and ESL programs as well as program continuity effects 
and program changing effects. 
Table B-9 shows the estimated effects of language programs on Reading and 
Mathematics test score gains by ELL status, for students who take English version of the 
tests.  I consider estimations for the group of students who are ELL status during t-1 and 
t (non-exiters) and the group of students who are ELL in t-1 and non-ELL in t (exiters).  
Both bilingual and ESL programs have a positive effect on Reading academic gains for 
students in grades 4 through 6.  Bilingual program improves academic gains in Reading 
0.141 standard deviations (grade 4  and 5) and 0.28 standard deviations (grade 6) while 
ESL program improves academic gains in Reading 0.061 standard deviations (grade 4 
and 5) and 0.136 standard deviations (grade 6).  For the Mathematics sample, results for 
the bilingual program are not conclusive.  I got a negative effect for grades 4 and 5, and 
a positive effect for grade 6.  ESL effect continues to be positive for the all grades. 
For the same group of non-exiters, both bilingual and ESL effects are positive 
when students continue in the same program during t-1 and t.  On the other hand, if the 
student remains in the program during t-1 and exit the program in t, bilingual and ESL 
effects are negative for all grades and all subjects (between 0.004 and 0.317 standard 
deviations).  This provide evidence of the importance of the continuity of the programs 
treatment to students who are ELL. 
Changing programs from bilingual to either ESL or regular program, or from 
ESL to either bilingual or regular program, has negative effects on Reading and 
Mathematics achievement gains for all grades (Table B-9).  However as a general result, 
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it is better to change toward bilingual program as the negative effect is smaller in 
magnitude. 
For students who exited ELL status during t (exiters), results are not conclusive. 
Bilingual effect is negative for students in Reading, but only for sixth graders in 
Mathematics.  ESL effect is negative for all groups but for sixth graders in Mathematics. 
Table B-11 shows the result for students who took the Spanish version of the test 
in grades 3-5 and English version of the test in grade 6.  Due to the small sample size of 
students in different paths, I can only obtain conclusion regarding the effects of changing 
programs.  As a general result it is better to change from ESL to bilingual programs, and 
from bilingual to regular program. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
Fig. A-1.  United States: Female labor force participation and total fertility rate, 1954-2006. 
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Fig. A-2.  The timing of the model. 
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Fig. A-3.  Three-period model as a tree. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. A-4.  The childbearing period. 
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Fig. A-5. Spacing of births. 
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Fig. A-6. Percentage of women with two children working at least 30 hours a week in the labor 
market, about the time of the births. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. A-7. Percentage of women with at least two children working at least 30 hours a week in the 
labor market, about the time of the births. 
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Table A-1 
Time with the children 
 
  
t=1 t=2 t=3 t=1 t=2 t=3
Child 1 Child2 Child 1 Child2 Child 1 Child2
1 P&B P&B P&NB a 0 0 a 0 -a 1 a 0 a 0 -2a 1 a 0 -a 1 0 0 0
2 P&B P&B NP&NB a 0 0 a 0 -a 1 a 0 a 0 -2a 1 a 0 -a 1 0 0  1 + 2
3 P&B P&NB P&B a 0 0 a 0 -a 1 0 a 0 -2a 1 a 0 0 0 0
4 P&B P&NB NP&B a 0 0 a 0 -a 1 0 a 0 -2a 1 a 0 0 0  1 + 2
5 P&B NP&B P&NB a 0 0 a 0 -a 1 a 0 a 0 -2a 1 a 0 -a 1 0  1 + 2 0
6 P&B NP&B NP&NB a 0 0 a 0 -a 1 a 0 a 0 -2a 1 a 0 -a 1 0  1 + 2  1 + 2
7 P&B NP&NB P&B a 0 0 a 0 -a 1 0 a 0 -2a 1 a 0 0  1 0
8 P&B NP&NB NP&B a 0 0 a 0 -a 1 0 a 0 -2a 1 a 0 0  1  1 + 2
9 NP&B P&B P&NB a 0 0 a 0 -a 1 a 0 a 0 -2a 1 a 0 -a 1  1 0 0
10 NP&B P&B NP&NB a 0 0 a 0 -a 1 a 0 a 0 -2a 1 a 0 -a 1  1 0  1 + 2
11 NP&B P&NB P&B a 0 0 a 0 -a 1 0 a 0 -2a 1 a 0  1 0 0
12 NP&B P&NB NP&B a 0 0 a 0 -a 1 0 a 0 -2a 1 a 0  1 0  1 + 2
13 NP&B NP&B P&NB a 0 0 a 0 -a 1 a 0 a 0 -2a 1 a 0 -a 1  1  1 + 2 0
14 NP&B NP&B NP&NB a 0 0 a 0 -a 1 a 0 a 0 -2a 1 a 0 -a 1  1  1 + 2  1 + 2
15 NP&B NP&NB P&B a 0 0 a 0 -a 1 0 a 0 -2a 1 a 0  1  1 0
16 NP&B NP&NB NP&B a 0 0 a 0 -a 1 0 a 0 -2a 1 a 0  1  1  1 + 2
*Participation behavior:  P=Participate, NP=Do Not participate;
Fertil ity behavior:  B=Birth, NB=No Birth
t=1 t=2 t=3
Basic time
Case-
scenario
Participation and Fertility 
Behavior*
Extra time
T A = a 0 -a 1 (age) T B =  1  2 N-1
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Table A-2 
Time allocated to leisure and participation in the labor market 
 
 
  
t=1 t=2 t=3 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=1 t=2 t=3
1 P&B P&B P&NB T w T w T w 1-T w -a 0 1-T w -2a 0 +a 1 1-T w -2a 0 +3a 1
2 P&B P&B NP&NB T w T w 0 1-T w -a 0 1-T w -2a 0 +a 1 1-2a 0 +3a 1 -  1 - 2
3 P&B P&NB P&B T w T w T w 1-T w -a 0 1-T w -a 0 +a 1 1-T w -2a 0 +2a 1
4 P&B P&NB NP&B T w T w 0 1-T w -a 0 1-T w -a 0 +a 1 1-2a 0 +2a 1 -  1 - 2
5 P&B NP&B P&NB T w 0 T w 1-T w -a 0 1-2a 0 +a 1 -  1 -  2 1-T w -2a 0 +3a 1
6 P&B NP&B NP&NB T w 0 0 1-T w -a 0 1-2a 0 +a 1 -  1 -  2 1-2a 0 +3a 1 -  1 - 2
7 P&B NP&NB P&B T w 0 T w 1-T w -a 0 1-a 0 +a 1 -  1 1-T w -2a 0 +2a 1
8 P&B NP&NB NP&B T w 0 0 1-T w -a 0 1-a 0 +a 1 -  1 1-2a 0 +2a 1 -  1 - 2
9 NP&B P&B P&NB 0 T w T w 1-a 0 -  1 1-T w -2a 0 +a 1 1-T w -2a 0 +3a 1
10 NP&B P&B NP&NB 0 T w 0 1-a 0 -  1 1-T w -2a 0 +a 1 1-2a 0 +3a 1 -  1 - 2
11 NP&B P&NB P&B 0 T w T w 1-a 0 -  1 1-T w -a 0 +a 1 1-T w -2a 0 +2a 1
12 NP&B P&NB NP&B 0 T w 0 1-a 0 -  1 1-T w -a 0 +a 1 1-2a 0 +2a 1 -  1 - 2
13 NP&B NP&B P&NB 0 0 T w 1-a 0 -  1 1-2a 0 +a 1 -  1 -  2 1-T w -2a 0 +3a 1
14 NP&B NP&B NP&NB 0 0 0 1-a 0 -  1 1-2a 0 +a 1 -  1 -  2 1-2a 0 +3a 1 -  1 - 2
15 NP&B NP&NB P&B 0 0 T w 1-a 0 -  1 1-a 0 +a 1 -  1 1-T w -2a 0 +2a 1
16 NP&B NP&NB NP&B 0 0 0 1-a 0 -  1 1-a 0 +a 1 -  1 1-2a 0 +2a 1 -  1 - 2
Working time
(1-T w -T children )(T w *P)
Leisure
Case-
scenario
Participation and Fertility 
Behavior*
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Table A-3 
Out-of-home childcare cost  
 
 
  
t=1 t=2 t=3 t=1 t=2 t=3 Lifetime
1 P&B P&B P&NB  1  2 + 1  3 + 2 2 1 2 2 + 3
2 P&B P&B NP&NB  1  2 + 1 0 2 1  2
3 P&B P&NB P&B  1  2  3 + 1 2 1  2 + 3
4 P&B P&NB NP&B  1  2 0  1  2
5 P&B NP&B P&NB  1 0  3 + 2  1  2 + 3
6 P&B NP&B NP&NB  1 0 0  1
7 P&B NP&NB P&B  1 0  3 + 1 2 1 + 3
8 P&B NP&NB NP&B  1 0 0  1
9 NP&B P&B P&NB 0  2 + 1  3 + 2  1 2 2 + 3
10 NP&B P&B NP&NB 0  2 + 1 0  1  2
11 NP&B P&NB P&B 0  2  3 + 1  1  2 + 3
12 NP&B P&NB NP&B 0  2 0  2
13 NP&B NP&B P&NB 0 0  3 + 2  2 + 3
14 NP&B NP&B NP&NB 0 0 0 0
15 NP&B NP&NB P&B 0 0  3 + 1  1  3
16 NP&B NP&NB NP&B 0 0 0 0
Out-of home childcare
Case-
scenario
Participation and Fertility 
Behavior*   1  2  3
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Table A-4 
Lifetime wages 
 
 
 
  
Lifetime wages
t=1 t=2 t=3
1 P P P w 0 w 0 w 0 3w 0
2 P P NP w 0 w 0 0 2w 0
3 P P P w 0 w 0 w 0 3w 0
4 P P NP w 0 w 0 0 2w 0
5 P NP P w 0 0 w 0 (1-d) w 0 (2-d)
6 P NP NP w 0 0 0 w 0
7 P NP P w 0 0 w 0 (1-d) w 0 (2-d)
8 P NP NP w 0 0 0 w 0
9 NP P P 0 w 0 (1-d) w 0 (1-d) 2w 0 (1-d)
10 NP P NP 0 w 0 (1-d) 0 w 0 (1-d)
11 NP P P 0 w 0 (1-d) w 0 (1-d) 2w 0 (1-d)
12 NP P NP 0 w 0 (1-d) 0 w 0 (1-d)
13 NP NP P 0 0 w 0 (1-d)
2 w 0 (1-d)
2
14 NP NP NP 0 0 0 0
15 NP NP P 0 0 w 0 (1-d)
2 w 0 (1-d)
2
16 NP NP NP 0 0 0 0
Case-
scenario
Participation behavior
Wage
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Table A-5 
Lifetime utility 
 
 
Case-
scenario 
 
Participation and Fertility 
Behavior 
[(pt,bt),(pt+1,bt+1),(pt+2,bt+2)] 
 
 
 
Lifetime Utility 
1 [(1,1),(1,1),(1,0)] 
                                
 
              
 
               
  
2 [(1,1),(1,1),(0,0)] 
                             
 
              
 
                
  
3 [(1,1),(1,0),(1,1)] 
                             
 
             
                
  
4 [(1,1),(1,0),(0,1)] 
                           
 
             
  
                
  
5 [(1,1),(0,1),(1,0)] 
                                  
 
               
 
               
  
6 [(1,1),(0,1),(0,0)] 
                      
 
               
 
 
                
 
 
7 [(1,1),(0,0),(1,1)] 
                               
 
            
 
               
  
8 [(1,1),(0,0),(0,1)] 
                       
             
 
 
                
  
9 [(0,1),(1,1),(1,0)] 
                                 
 
              
 
               
  
10 [(0,1),(1,1),(0,0)] 
                             
 
              
 
                
  
11 [(0,1),(1,0),(1,1)] 
                                
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12 [(0,1),(1,0),(0,1)] 
                           
 
             
 
                
  
13 
[(0,1),(0,1),(1,0)] 
 
              
                
 
               
 
               
  
14 [(0,1),(0,1),(0,0)] 
                       
 
               
 
 
                
  
15 [(0,1),(0,0),(1,1)] 
               
                
 
            
 
               
  
16 [(0,1),(0,0),(0,1)] 
                       
 
            
 
 
                
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Table A-6 
Summary statistics 
 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Number of children 1962 2.0 0.0 3748 2.8 1.0
Number of children expected 1955 2.5 1.5 3733 2.6 1.5
Number of children desired 1946 2.2 1.3 3707 2.2 1.5
Age in 1979 1962 17.9 2.3 3748 17.9 2.3
Age began first marriage 1770 22.3 4.7 3355 21.8 4.8
Age at first birth 1961 23.4 5.1 3747 22.0 4.9
Age at second birth 1960 27.7 5.4 3746 25.8 5.4
Age at third birth - - - 1786 27.7 5.2
Months between first marriage and first birth 1769 40.6 43.0 3354 39.4 46.1
Months between first and second birth 1692 47.9 32.1 3426 43.5 31.0
Months between second and third birth - - - 1558 42.2 29.3
First child is male 1957 49.8% 0.5 3740 50.3% 0.5
Second child is male 1960 50.9% 0.5 3742 51.6% 0.5
First two children same gender 1955 55.3% 0.5 3734 51.3% 0.5
Ever married 1962 92.4% 0.3 3748 91.8% 0.3
Marriage before first birth 1769 82.1% 0.4 3354 75.1% 0.4
Second birth after second marriage 1962 10.3% 0.3 3748 8.7% 0.3
Years of schooling 1962 13.2 2.4 3748 12.9 2.5
Catholic 1962 33.3% 0.5 3748 33.1% 0.5
Women with two children Women with at least two children
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Table A-7 
Spacing by participation status during different stages of the childbearing period, 1 period worked 
At least one 
period worked   
Prediction on 
spacing   
All women at least two 
children, no twins 
All women with two 
children, no twins 
P0 P1 P2   
Based 
on H1 
Based 
on H2   % 
Spacing 
(mean) % 
Spacing 
(mean) 
                      
0 0 0   - -   15.1% 37.50391 19.0% 32.83589 
0 0 1   - Less   5.8% 30.32653 7.0% 26.97925 
0 1 0   More -   9.9% 55.28743 11.3% 51.69948 
0 1 1   More -   14.4% 64.46721 14.3% 58.38037 
1 0 0   - -   6.3% 28.75701 6.1% 27.55024 
1 0 1   - Less   5.6% 32.44681 5.9% 28.14428 
1 1 0   More -   8.9% 50.19205 8.2% 48.24286 
1 1 1   More -   34.0% 51.91478 28.3% 49.24587 
P0: Before first birth 
     P1: Childbirth interval  
     P2: After second birth 
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Table A-8 
Spacing by participation status during different stages of the childbearing period, 5 periods worked 
At least five 
periods worked   
Prediction on 
spacing   
All women at least two 
children, no twins 
All women with two 
children, no twins 
P0 P1 P2   
Based 
on H1 
Based 
on H2   % 
Spacing 
(mean) % 
Spacing 
(mean) 
                      
0 0 0   - -   26.0% 36.94091 31.6% 33.10517 
0 0 1   - Less   6.6% 32.58929 7.7% 28.32197 
0 1 0   More -   15.7% 58.46617 16.3% 56.25448 
0 1 1   More -   16.4% 63.94604 15.0% 58.63883 
1 0 0   - -   5.0% 29.89412 4.8% 28.27273 
1 0 1   - Less   2.8% 29.70833 2.9% 27.37374 
1 1 0   More -   8.1% 50.83212 6.4% 49.41096 
1 1 1   More -   19.3% 51.92945 15.2% 49.54023 
P0: Before first birth 
     P1: Childbirth interval  
     P2: After second birth 
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Table A-9 
Instruments for past, current and future participation, zero hours worked 
 
 
 
  
Variable Name Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max
State v3_0_0 5004 25.20 14.44 25.31 1 50
Federal  income tax l iabi l i ty v4_0_0 5004 627.8 2,167.2 0.0 -165.2 64,343.1
State income tax l iabi l i ty v5_0_0 5004 114.4 463.0 0.0 -667.7 14,792.9
FICA (OADSI and HI, employee and employer) v6_0_0 5004 626.0 1,121.5 0.0 0.0 9,905.5
Effective federa l  marginal  rate v7_0_0 5004 2.31 5.52 0.00 -3.55 47.08
Effective s tate marginal  rate v8_0_0 5004 0.66 1.33 0.00 -1.02 11.00
FICA rate v9_0_0 5004 13.55 0.90 13.48 12.26 14.70
State v3_0_1 4503 25.22 14.96 26.00 1 51
Federal  income tax l iabi l i ty v4_0_1 4503 2,039.2 5,644.2 374.0 -335.4 153,858.1
State income tax l iabi l i ty v5_0_1 4503 415.1 1,196.9 0.0 -831.1 21,155.9
FICA (OADSI and HI, employee and employer) v6_0_1 4503 2,018.4 2,637.1 1,059.7 0.0 23,719.5
Effective federa l  marginal  rate v7_0_1 4503 7.91 9.71 6.45 -7.65 49.00
Effective s tate marginal  rate v8_0_1 4503 1.69 2.36 0.00 -2.26 15.00
FICA rate v9_0_1 4503 14.20 1.00 14.43 12.26 15.30
State v3_0_2 3738 24.93 14.89 25.00 1 50
Federal  income tax l iabi l i ty v4_0_2 3738 3,386.0 7,886.6 1,034.1 -324.0 139,412.3
State income tax l iabi l i ty v5_0_2 3738 762.9 1,698.5 130.9 -962.9 21,155.9
FICA (OADSI and HI, employee and employer) v6_0_2 3738 3,369.2 3,546.0 2,435.1 0.0 25,114.7
Effective federa l  marginal  rate v7_0_2 3738 7.61 10.11 7.98 -7.65 36.28
Effective s tate marginal  rate v8_0_2 3738 2.11 2.33 1.36 -1.82 10.18
FICA rate v9_0_2 3738 15.11 0.20 15.18 14.70 15.30
Zero hrs 
worked
Before 
first birth
During 
childbirth 
interval
After 
second 
birth
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Table A-10 
Instruments for past, current and future participation, twenty hours worked 
 
 
  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max
State v3_20_0 5004 25.20 14.44 25.31 1 50
Federal  income tax l iabi l i ty v4_20_0 5004 1,952.5 3,684.2 799.4 -165.2 72,043.3
State income tax l iabi l i ty v5_20_0 5004 367.7 784.2 89.4 -667.7 16,033.3
FICA (OADSI and HI, employee and employer) v6_20_0 5004 1,732.4 1,876.7 1,120.1 0.0 15,518.7
Effective federa l  marginal  rate v7_20_0 5004 11.32 8.74 12.02 -3.55 50.00
Effective s tate marginal  rate v8_20_0 5004 2.11 2.17 1.64 -1.02 15.00
FICA rate v9_20_0 5004 13.40 1.08 13.38 0.00 14.70
State v3_20_1 4503 25.22 14.96 26.00 1 51
Federal  income tax l iabi l i ty v4_20_1 4503 4,279.9 9,142.1 1,622.9 -212.9 184,740.7
State income tax l iabi l i ty v5_20_1 4503 836.5 1,946.0 188.1 -795.7 40,483.9
FICA (OADSI and HI, employee and employer) v6_20_1 4503 3,495.7 3,891.8 2,226.0 0.0 34,759.7
Effective federa l  marginal  rate v7_20_1 4503 14.16 10.21 15.00 -7.65 49.00
Effective s tate marginal  rate v8_20_1 4503 2.70 2.71 2.33 -2.06 51.68
FICA rate v9_20_1 4503 13.95 1.55 14.20 0.00 15.30
State v3_20_2 3738 24.93 14.89 25.00 1 50
Federal  income tax l iabi l i ty v4_20_2 3738 6,578.7 13,140.0 2,780.2 -221.0 305,519.4
State income tax l iabi l i ty v5_20_2 3738 1,387.2 2,483.9 539.3 -879.7 30,614.0
FICA (OADSI and HI, employee and employer) v6_20_2 3738 5,365.7 4,783.4 4,165.0 0.0 38,346.4
Effective federa l  marginal  rate v7_20_2 3738 13.46 9.85 14.60 -7.65 37.91
Effective s tate marginal  rate v8_20_2 3738 3.02 2.49 2.93 -1.60 9.60
FICA rate v9_20_2 3738 14.87 0.96 15.13 2.32 15.30
20 hrs 
worked
Before 
first birth
During 
childbirth 
interval
After 
second 
birth
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Table A-11 
Instruments for past, current and future participation, forty hours worked 
 
  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max
State v3_40_0 5004 25.20 14.44 25.31 1 50
Federal  income tax l iabi l i ty v4_40_0 5004 1,952.5 3,684.2 799.4 -165.2 72,043.3
State income tax l iabi l i ty v5_40_0 5004 367.7 784.2 89.4 -667.7 16,033.3
FICA (OADSI and HI, employee and employer) v6_40_0 5004 1,732.4 1,876.7 1,120.1 0.0 15,518.7
Effective federa l  marginal  rate v7_40_0 5004 11.32 8.74 12.03 -3.55 50.00
Effective s tate marginal  rate v8_40_0 5004 2.11 2.17 1.64 -1.02 15.00
FICA rate v9_40_0 5004 13.40 1.08 13.38 0.00 14.70
State v3_40_1 4503 25.22 14.96 26.00 1 51
Federal  income tax l iabi l i ty v4_40_1 4503 4,279.9 9,142.1 1,622.9 -212.9 184,740.7
State income tax l iabi l i ty v5_40_1 4503 836.5 1,946.0 188.1 -795.7 40,483.9
FICA (OADSI and HI, employee and employer) v6_40_1 4503 3,495.7 3,891.8 2,226.0 0.0 34,759.7
Effective federa l  marginal  rate v7_40_1 4503 14.16 10.21 15.00 -7.65 49.00
Effective s tate marginal  rate v8_40_1 4503 2.70 2.71 2.33 -2.06 51.68
FICA rate v9_40_1 4503 13.95 1.55 14.20 0.00 15.30
State v3_40_2 3738 24.93 14.89 25.00 1 50
Federal  income tax l iabi l i ty v4_40_2 3738 6,578.7 13,140.0 2,780.2 -221.0 305,519.4
State income tax l iabi l i ty v5_40_2 3738 1,387.2 2,483.9 539.3 -879.7 30,614.0
FICA (OADSI and HI, employee and employer) v6_40_2 3738 5,365.7 4,783.4 4,165.0 0.0 38,346.4
Effective federa l  marginal  rate v7_40_2 3738 13.46 9.85 14.60 -7.65 37.91
Effective s tate marginal  rate v8_40_2 3738 3.02 2.49 2.93 -1.60 9.60
FICA rate v9_40_2 3738 14.87 0.96 15.13 2.32 15.30
40 hrs 
worked
Before 
first birth
During 
childbirth 
interval
After 
second 
birth
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Table A-12 
First stage, participation before first birth 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
v3_0_0 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.15) (1.05) (1.08) (0.68) (1.29) (1.33)
v4_0_0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(1.16) (1.62) (1.56) (1.60) (0.81) (1.57) (1.47) (1.61)
v5_0_0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.0) (1.11) (0.79) (0.93) (0.01) (1.11) (0.90) (1.20)
v6_0_0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(4.08)** (2.76)** (2.87)** (2.89)** (2.83)** (2.67)** (2.65)** (2.86)**
v7_0_0 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.08
(1.94) (2.06)* (1.87) (1.60) (2.16)* (2.07)* (1.88) (2.02)*
v8_0_0 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.08 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06
(0.0) (-0.35) (-0.28) (0.03) (-0.77) (-0.47) (-0.54) (-0.71)
v9_0_0 0.13 0.35 0.41 0.28 0.05 0.39 0.39 0.28
(0.40) (0.93) (1.11) (0.87) (0.12) (1.04) (1.05) (0.77)
v4_20_0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(1.76) (2.26)* (2.20)* (2.52)* (1.97)* (2.23)* (2.11)* (2.30)*
v5_20_0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.29) (1.35) (0.33) (1.33) (0.98) (1.30)
v6_20_0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(4.33)** (2.99)** (3.09)** (3.54)** (3.27)** (2.95)** (2.96)** (3.08)**
v7_20_0 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
(0.14) (-0.5) (-0.57) (0.23) (-1.01) (-0.58) (-0.61) (-0.34)
v8_20_0 0.00 -0.08 -0.04 -0.06 -0.02 -0.08 -0.03 -0.05
(0.05) (-1.29) (-0.59) (-1.09) (-0.25) (-1.25) (-0.55) (-0.74)
v9_20_0 0.03 -0.27 -0.24 -0.13 -0.03 -0.26 -0.23 -0.13
(0.20) (-1.2) (-1.13) (-0.73) (-0.16) (-1.15) (-1.06) (-0.67)
v5_40_0 0.00 0.00
(0.96) (1.14)
v3_20_0 0.00 0.01
(0.77) (1.25)
Constant -9.35 -9.65 -9.52 -11.47 -15.87 -11.32 -9.42 -12.20
(-2.95)** (-2.39)* (-2.39)* (-3.42)** (-1.68) (-1.34) (-1.13) (-1.53)
Observations 1186.00 885.00 909.00 1164.00 744.00 885.00 895.00 970.00
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Participation before childbearing
Note: All  specifications control for some husband's income measure: (1) and (5) use permanent income from 
wages, (2) and (6) income from wages around the births, (3) and (7) total income around the births, (4) and (8) 
income in childbirth interval and after second birth.  Specifications (1)-(4) controls for number of children ever 
born, (5)-(8) for predicted number using mixed sibling-sex composition. 
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Table A-13 
First stage, participation during childbirth interval (current participation)  
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
v8_0_0 -0.124 -0.133 -0.117 -0.099 -0.131 -0.136 -0.123 -0.133
(-1.13) (-1.13) (-1.01) (-0.96) (-1.02) (-1.17) (-1.07) (-1.22)
v9_0_0 -2.015 -1.599 -1.602 -1.784 -2.095 -1.861 -1.758 -1.638
(-3.83)** (-2.59)** (-2.63)** (-3.35)** (-3.04)** (-3.03)** (-2.89)** (-2.85)**
v4_20_0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(0.33) (0.62) (0.67) (0.66) (0.53) (0.52) (0.50) (0.76)
v6_20_0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(0.12) (0.30) (0.41) (0.51) (0.41) (0.27) (0.21) (0.29)
v9_20_0 -0.397 -0.522 -0.527 -0.462 -0.497 -0.505 -0.569
(-1.71) (2.59)** (2.59)** (-1.87) (2.46)* (2.49)* (2.76)**
unemp1 -0.087 -0.174 -0.157 -0.132 -0.151 -0.173 -0.162 -0.208
(-0.8) (-1.57) (-1.42) (-1.36) (-1.19) (-1.57) (-1.47) (1.99)*
v4_0_1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(1.58) (1.45) (1.68) (1.59) (1.68) (1.42) (1.56) (1.68)
v5_0_1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(0.28) (0.29) (0.44) (0.52) (0.44) (0.32) (0.36) (0.62)
v6_0_1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-4.44)** (-4.15)** (-4.30)** (-4.43)** (-4.14)** (-4.04)** (-4.03)** (-4.01)**
v7_0_1 -0.061 -0.062 -0.055 -0.05 -0.049 -0.069 -0.065 -0.044
(-2.19)* (-1.92) (-1.76) (-1.79) (-1.53) (-2.17)* (-2.09)* (-1.49)
v8_0_1 -0.209 -0.279 -0.257 -0.247 -0.21 -0.277 -0.255 -0.247
(-2.39)* (-2.90)** (-2.72)** (-2.98)** (-2.18)* (-2.89)** (-2.69)** (-2.82)**
v9_0_1 2.025 1.889 1.911 1.996 1.976 2.073 2.014 1.964
(6.11)** (4.90)** (4.97)** (5.81)** (4.82)** (5.45)** (5.31)** (5.34)**
v4_20_1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(2.35)* (1.61) (1.61) (1.74) (1.98)* (1.64) (1.67) (1.78)
v5_20_1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(1.45) (1.06) (1.02) (1.19) (1.44) (1.17) (1.15) (1.33)
v6_20_1 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0
(4.79)** (3.65)** (3.63)** (3.83)** (3.71)** (3.62)** (3.66)** (3.65)**
v7_20_1 0.041 0.055 0.053 0.074 0.033 0.057 0.057 0.059
(1.79) (1.91) (1.88) (2.96)** (1.08) (1.95) (1.98)* (2.15)*
v8_20_1 0.194 0.238 0.237 0.228 0.173 0.225 0.219 0.224
(2.39)* (2.66)** (2.71)** (2.92)** (1.90) (2.53)* (2.47)* (2.72)**
v9_20_1 0.333 0.259 0.264 0.288 0.3 0.267 0.269 0.292
(3.89)** (3.14)** (3.15)** (3.58)** (3.37)** (3.09)** (3.05)** (3.56)**
Constant 8.842 7.074 6.099 5.524 -2.717 7.425 6.673 3.317
(2.09)* (1.25) (1.11) (1.12) (-0.24) (0.72) (0.65) (0.34)
Observations 1120 849 873 1145 714 849 859 952
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Participation during childbirth interval (current participation)
Note: All specifications control for some husband's income measure: (1) and (5) use permanent income from 
wages, (2) and (6) income from wages around the births, (3) and (7) total income around the births, (4) and (8) 
income in childbirth interval and after second birth.  Specifications (1)-(4) controls for number of children ever 
born, (5)-(8) for predicted number using mixed sibling-sex composition. 
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Table A-14 
First stage, participation after the second birth (future participation) 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
unemp0 0.326 0.331 0.347 0.266 0.434 0.342 0.363 0.315
(2.07)* (2.05)* (2.19)* (1.97)* (2.33)* (2.11)* (2.26)* (2.08)*
v3_0_0 -0.014 -0.027 -0.009 -0.012 -0.029 -0.019
(-0.98) (-1.85) (-0.71) (-0.72) (-1.98)* (-1.43)
v4_0_0 0 0.001 0.001 0 0 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.41) (1.98)* (1.97)* (1.68) (1.53) (2.01)* (1.97)* (1.94)
v6_0_0 0 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.73) (-2.11)* (-2.41)* (-2.24)* (-1.34) (-2.12)* (-2.33)* (-2.24)*
v8_0_0 -0.218 -0.091 -0.116 -0.178 -0.318 -0.092 -0.107 -0.199
(-1.81) (-0.78) (-1.04) (-1.75) (-2.36)* (-0.79) (-0.96) (-1.9)
v6_20_0 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.82) (1.85) (2.03)* (2.69)** (1.84) (1.80) (1.90) (2.25)*
v9_20_0 -0.542 -0.374 -0.298 -0.436 -0.382 -0.387 -0.338
(-1.99)* (-1.49) (-1.33) (-1.42) (-1.56) (-1.61) (-1.47)
unemp1 -0.244 -0.285 -0.305 -0.278 -0.319 -0.301 -0.324 -0.356
(-1.97)* (-2.12)* (-2.29)* (-2.48)* (-2.12)* (-2.21)* (-2.39)* (-2.82)**
v4_0_1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(1.80) (2.13)* (2.18)* (1.81) (1.91) (2.05)* (1.87) (1.59)
v9_0_1 0.98 0.611 0.617 0.63 1.117 0.572 0.571 0.379
(1.99)* (1.16) (1.19) (1.42) (1.88) (1.08) (1.09) (0.78)
v7_20_1 0.052 0.012 0 0.038 0.011 0.001 0.006
(2.10)* (0.40) 0 (1.13) (0.35) (0.02) (0.21)
v8_20_1 0.09 0.211 0.188 0.062 0.21 0.208 0.134
(1.02) (1.87) (2.11)* (0.54) (1.85) (1.85) (1.29)
v6_0_2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(2.26)* (2.54)* (2.69)** (2.94)** -1.81 (2.53)* (2.62)** (2.57)*
v7_0_2 -0.107 -0.054 -0.053 -0.052 -0.094 -0.056 -0.052 -0.06
(-2.52)* (-1.44) (-1.42) (-1.65) (-1.8) (-1.48) (-1.4) (-1.74)
v6_20_2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(2.70)** (2.58)** (2.56)* (3.66)** -1.9 (2.65)** (2.74)** (2.86)**
v7_20_2 0.147 0.098 0.111 0.054 0.129 0.098 0.1 0.084
(3.30)** (2.44)* (2.80)** (1.55) (2.41)* (2.43)* (2.50)* (2.20)*
v9_40_2 0.313
(2.85)**
v9_20_2 0.301 0.294 0.307 0.372 0.309 0.306 0.353
(2.67)** (2.78)** (3.43)** (2.92)** (2.72)** (2.87)** (3.64)**
v8_40_1 0.229
(2.07)*
Constant 12.752 -17.259 -14.895 3.627 9.678 -6.334 -5.889 -0.271
(0.46) (-0.56) (-0.49) (0.14) (0.28) (-0.2) (-0.19) (-0.01)
Obs. 913 831 855 1118 693 831 841 932
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Participation after the second birth (future participation)
Note: All specifications control for some husband's income measure: (1) and (5) use permanent income from 
wages, (2) and (6) income from wages around the births, (3) and (7) total income around the births, (4) and 
(8) income in childbirth interval and after second birth.  Specifications (1)-(4) controls for number of 
children ever born, (5)-(8) for predicted number using mixed sibling-sex composition. 
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Table A-15 
Second stage, current and future participation on fertility spacing 
 
 
  
Current Participation Future Participation
15.35 0.52
(8.94)** (0.33)
49.154 -13.12
(9.62)** (-2.53)*
54.681 -13.582
(10.85)** (-2.68)**
53.055 -13.144
(10.38)** (-2.51)**
57.773 -13.77
(11.47)** (-2.69)**
IV
OLS 
Controlling for 
husband's permanent 
income
Controlling for 
husband's transitory 
income
(Number of months)
Controlling for 
husband's permanent 
income
Marginal Tax 
Schedule and 
unemployment 
rate
Marginal Tax 
Schedule, 
unemployment 
rate, and Mixed 
Sex 
Composition
Controlling for 
husband's transitory 
income
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Table A-16 
Second stage, current and conditional future participation on fertility spacing 
 
  
Current Participation
Future Participation 
given no current 
participation
33.217 -22.091
(7.50)** (-4.14)**
35.818 -23.679
(8.57)** (-4.56)**
34.183 -22.868
(7.84)** (-4.30)**
39.398 -23.817
(9.47)** (-4.65)**
IV for number 
of children ever 
born
Husband's income 
from wages around 
the time of the birth
Husband's income 
from wages during 
and after childbirth 
interval
First Stage's controls
(Number of months)
Number of 
children ever 
born
Husband's income 
from wages around 
the time of the birth
Husband's income 
from wages during 
and after childbirth 
interval
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Table A-17 
Heterogeneity in effects of labor market participation on fertility spacing 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Current Participation 50.2 59.57 69.51 62.97 37.21
(10.92)** (9.10)** (9.29)** (10.56)** (2.07)*
Future Participation -12.9 -32.2 -26.99 -20.22 6.19
(-2.60) (-4.47) (-3.33)** (-3.21)** (0.36)
Current Participation x Schooling (>12 years) -16.16
(-1.92)
Future Participation x Schooling (>12 years) 31.4
(3.65)**
Current Participation x Husband's income (>median) -29.05
(-3.20)**
Future Participation x Husband's income (>median) 19.8
(2.12)*
Current Participation x More than two children -29.92
(-3.68)**
Future Participation x More than two children 13.89
(1.68)
Current Participation x Age at first birth (<=20) 38.3
(1.94)
Future Participation x Age at first birth (<=20) -35.98
(-1.81)
Current Participation x Age at first birth (21-25) 16.04
(0.83)
Future Participation x Age at first birth (21-25) -20.13
(-1.08)
Current Participation x Age at first birth (26-30) -5.68
(-0.29)
Future Participation x Age at first birth (26-30) -8.77
(-0.47)
Number of months between the first and the second birth
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Table A-18 
Robustness.  current and future participation on spacing, IV for number of children (mixed sibling-sex somposition) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Past experience (before first birth) -28.548 -13.126 -16.006 -11.138 -39.071 -33.832 -36.958 -37.882
(-3.42)** (-1.63) (-2.03)* (-1.58) (-4.03)** (-3.84)** (-4.11)** (-4.60)**
Current participation (during childbirth interval) 56.769 49.56 53.159 62.198 57.773 50.2 52.327 58.934
(12.14)** (10.48)** (11.24)** (13.36)** (11.47)** (10.92)** (11.28)** (13.01)**
Future Participation (after second birth) -18.747 -14.193 -16.381 -30.234 -13.77 -12.902 -13.039 -16.814
(-3.57)** (-2.81)** (-3.23)** (-5.45)** (-2.69)** (-2.60)** (-2.62)** (-3.36)**
Age began first marriage -0.796 -2 -2.444 -2.374 -2.019 -1.813 -2.051 -1.943
(-0.43) (-1.13) (-1.4) (-1.46) (-1.03) (-1.03) (-1.17) (-1.18)
Age at first birth 8.999 1.752 2.508 2.644 7.456 2.844 2.867 0.53
(1.74) (0.35) (0.51) (0.58) (1.43) (0.57) (0.59) (0.12)
Age2 -0.155 -0.026 -0.031 -0.025 -0.106 -0.049 -0.046 -0.002
(-1.98)* (-0.34) (-0.41) (-0.35) (-1.3) (-0.64) (-0.61) (-0.03)
Months between first marriage and first birth -0.058 -0.154 -0.189 -0.22 -0.112 -0.122 -0.142 -0.144
(-0.37) (-1.04) (-1.3) (-1.62) (-0.67) (-0.83) (-0.97) (-1.04)
Number children ever born (predicted) 26.616 4.768 4.988 7.135 19.469 -4.62 -6.715 -8.262
(1.94) (0.35) (0.37) (0.57) (1.41) (-0.34) (-0.5) (-0.67)
Second birth after second marriage 24.413 16.999 16.629 15.88 25.036 17.532 17.401 16.723
(7.52)** (5.75)** (5.68)** (5.75)** (7.04)** (5.93)** (5.92)** (5.97)**
Marriage before first birth 8.661 -2.566 -3.737 -3.256 -3.83 -4.754 -5.669 -7.832
(1.04) (-0.33) (-0.49) (-0.55) (-0.45) (-0.62) (-0.74) (-1.32)
Years of Schooling -0.05 -0.555 -0.573 -0.711 -0.038 -0.33 -0.376 -0.557
(-0.13) (-1.42) (-1.49) (-2.02)* (-0.1) (-0.84) (-0.97) (-1.57)
ln(husband's income around first birth ) 8.104 8.681 9.191 6.326 10.182 8.935 9.324 7.658
(4.74)** (5.14)** (5.53)** (4.47)** (5.90)** (5.31)** (5.60)** (5.45)**
ln(husband's income around second birth ) -3.362 -0.963 -1.319 1.098 -4.865 -1.167 -1.386 2.816
(-1.75) (-0.55) (-0.77) (0.81) (-2.50)* (-0.67) (-0.81) (2.04)*
Constant -154.556 -23.238 -27.772 -34.158 -98.609 -20.061 -14.434 -11.136
(-1.9) (-0.3) (-0.36) (-0.47) (-1.18) (-0.25) (-0.19) (-0.15)
Observations 599 736 745 821 599 736 745 821
Husband's income 
from wages about 
the time of the 
first birth
Husband's total 
income about the 
time of the first 
birth
Husband's income 
from wages 
during childbirth 
interval
Husband's income 
from wages about 
the time of the 
first birth
Husband's total 
income about the 
time of the first 
birth
Husband's income 
from wages 
during childbirth 
interval
Husband's income 
from wages about 
the time of the 
second birth
Husband's total 
income about the 
time of the second 
birth
Husband's income 
from wages after 
the second birth
Husband's income 
from wages about 
the time of the 
second birth
Husband's total 
income about the 
time of the second 
birth
Husband's income 
from wages after 
the second birth
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
First stage
Number of children ever born IV for number of children ever born
Husband's income 
from wages
Husband's income 
from wages
months12birth
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. ELL decision chart 
All students 
Home Language Survey (HLS) 
Language spoken at home & by student 
 
English English & Other  Not English 
Non LEP 
TESTS 
LEP Non LEP 
LPAC Committee Meeting 
Parental Notification Non LEP 
PLACEMENT: Required bilingual PLACEMENT: Required ESL 
Parental permission Parental permission 
YES NO NO YES 
BILINGUAL 
CLASSROOM 
 
REGULAR 
CLASSROOM 
ESL CLASSROOM 
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Table B-1 
Samples of cohorts of Texas elementary school students 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B-2 
Summary statistics for the students who took English version of the tests 
  
Model with reading gains as 
the dependent variable   
Model with reading gains as 
the dependent variable 
Number of observations 2,526,288  
 
2,574,255  
  Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev. 
      Raw score 34.72 5.36 
 
36.08 6.60 
Scale score 2304 189 
 
2313 216 
Meet standard 91.7% 27.7% 
 
87.1% 33.5% 
Prior year score 2281 171 
 
2294 198 
Migrant status 0.9% 9.6% 
 
0.9% 9.7% 
Economically disadvantaged 42.5% 49.4% 
 
42.7% 49.5% 
Hispanic 40.7% 49.1% 
 
40.9% 49.2% 
ELL 4.2% 20.2% 
 
4.6% 21.1% 
Bilingual program 1.6% 12.4% 
 
1.8% 13.3% 
ESL program 2.3% 14.9%  2.4% 15.3% 
 
 
grade 3 grade 4 grade 5 grade 6
Reading
EEEE read English English English English 2,526,288           
SSSE read Spanish Spanish Spanish English 45,807                 
Mathematics
EEEE math English English English English 2,574,255           
SSSE math Spanish Spanish Spanish English 31,884                 
Language  version of the test Number of 
observations
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Table B-3 
Summary statistics for the students who took Spanish version of the tests in grades 3-5 
  
Model with reading gains as 
the dependent variable   
Model with reading gains as 
the dependent variable 
Number of observations 45,807  
 
31,884  
  Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev. 
      Raw score 29.53 6.46 
 
30.30 7.73 
Scale score 2179 177 
 
2154 211 
Meet standard 76.5% 42.4% 
 
62.6% 48.4% 
Prior year score 2192 172 
 
2143 195 
Migrant status 4.2% 20.1% 
 
4.2% 20.0% 
Economically disadvantaged 71.0% 45.4% 
 
72.2% 44.8% 
Hispanic 99.8% 4.4% 
 
99.8% 4.9% 
ELL 98.3% 12.9% 
 
97.9% 14.5% 
Bilingual program 74.7% 43.5% 
 
75.9% 42.8% 
ESL program 22.9% 42.0%  21.5% 41.1% 
 
 
 
Table B-4  
Cohorts of Texas elementary school students, reading sample, students who took English version 
of the test 
 
 
 
4 5 6 Observations
2004 201,969   - - 201,969            
2005 205,445   201,969   - 407,414            
2006 209,965   205,445   201,969   617,379            
2007 224,717   209,965   205,445   640,127            
2008 - 224,717   209,965   434,682            
2009 - - 224,717   224,717            
842,096 842,096 842,096 2,526,288
Grades
Year
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Table B-5 
Distribution of ELL students in Texas by classroom type and grade level, reading sample, 
students who took English version of the test 
    Grade 
    4 5 6 
ELL 
 
                 
51,534  
                 
33,258  
                 
22,384  
     Classroom  (%) 
 
Regular 12.3% 12.0% 11.5% 
 
Bilingual 42.3% 43.7% 7.5% 
 ESL 45.4% 44.3% 81.0% 
 
 
 
Table B-6 
Distribution of ELL students in Texas by classroom type and grade level, reading sample, 
students who took Spanish version of the test in grades 3-5 
    Grade 
    4 5 6 
ELL 
 
                 
51,534  
                 
33,258  
                 
22,384  
     Classroom  (%) 
 
Regular 12.3% 12.0% 11.5% 
 
Bilingual 42.3% 43.7% 7.5% 
 ESL 45.4% 44.3% 81.0% 
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Table B-7 
Number of observations of each path 
 
Notes:  ell (English language learner), bil (Bilingual program), esl (English as a second language 
program). 
 
 
Path lell lbil lesl ell bil esl EEEE read EEEE math SSSE read SSSE math
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 47,770        49,380        479              386              
2 1 1 0 0 0 1 61                70                45                31                
3 1 1 0 0 1 0 637              680              127              85                
4 1 0 1 0 0 0 45,681        46,379        10                11                
5 1 0 1 0 0 1 499              535              -               -               
6 1 0 1 0 1 0 31                32                -               -               
7 1 0 0 0 0 0 16,629        16,864        8                   3                   
8 1 0 0 0 0 1 34                34                -               -               
9 1 0 0 0 1 0 12                12                3                   2                   
10 1 1 0 1 0 0 998              1,180          488              302              
11 1 1 0 1 0 1 10,256        12,222        10,136        6,625          
12 1 1 0 1 1 0 35,203        41,588        33,591        23,732        
13 1 0 1 1 0 0 1,217          1,351          -               -               
14 1 0 1 1 0 1 40,965        43,692        228              128              
15 1 0 1 1 1 0 628              665              34                27                
16 1 0 0 1 0 0 8,795          9,407          6                   1                   
17 1 0 0 1 0 1 793              878              27                15                
18 1 0 0 1 1 0 197              237              141              93                
19 0 1 0 0 0 0 1,059          1,086          8                   15                
20 0 1 0 0 0 1 1                   1                   1                   -               
21 0 1 0 0 1 0 482              476              12                -               
22 0 0 1 0 0 0 805              863              -               -               
23 0 0 1 0 0 1 38                39                -               -               
24 0 0 1 0 1 0 2                   2                   -               -               
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,304,768  2,337,509  79                133              
26 0 0 0 0 0 1 286              306              -               -               
27 0 0 0 0 1 0 317              309              3                   15                
28 0 1 0 1 0 0 10                15                1                   1                   
29 0 1 0 1 0 1 46                60                46                28                
30 0 1 0 1 1 0 112              141              139              116              
31 0 0 1 1 0 0 27                29                -               -               
32 0 0 1 1 0 1 265              306              2                   2                   
33 0 0 1 1 1 0 8                   9                   1                   -               
34 0 0 0 1 0 0 1,881          1,969          5                   3                   
35 0 0 0 1 0 1 3,912          4,006          21                13                
36 0 0 0 1 1 0 1,863          1,923          166              117              
2,526,288  2,574,255  45,807        31,884        
period t-1 period t Number of observations
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Table B-8 
Effect of paths on standardized gains for students who took English version of the test 
 
Notes:  ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10% 
 
 
Path lell lbil lesl ell bil esl
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0.015 0.314 ** -0.051 ** -0.084
2 1 1 0 0 0 1 -0.274 -0.461 ** -0.148 -0.066
3 1 1 0 0 1 0 0.035 0.082 0.017 0.004
4 1 0 1 0 0 0 0.001 0.271 ** -0.038 ** 0.084 *
5 1 0 1 0 0 1 0.009 1.105 ** -0.091 -0.880 *
6 1 0 1 0 1 0 0.429 N.A. 0.669 N.A.
7 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.041 * 0.259 ** -0.032 * 0.088
8 1 0 0 0 0 1 -0.618 * 0.270 ** 0.258 0.510 **
9 1 0 0 0 1 0 0.382 N.A. -0.821 ** N.A.
10 1 1 0 1 0 0 0.254 ** 0.337 -0.083 -0.313
11 1 1 0 1 0 1 0.241 ** 0.521 ** -0.095 ** 0.091
12 1 1 0 1 1 0 0.408 ** 0.622 ** 0.000 0.208 **
13 1 0 1 1 0 0 0.164 ** 0.024 -0.037 -0.028
14 1 0 1 1 0 1 0.328 ** 0.478 ** 0.014 0.156 **
15 1 0 1 1 1 0 0.318 ** 0.464 ** 0.000 0.183
16 1 0 0 1 0 0 0.267 ** 0.341 ** 0.011 0.087
17 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.377 ** 0.309 0.121 0.069
18 1 0 0 1 1 0 0.178 -0.275 0.002 -0.285
19 0 1 0 0 0 0 -0.025 0.046 -0.195 ** 0.427 *
20 0 1 0 0 0 1 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
21 0 1 0 0 1 0 0.186 0.576 * -0.256 -0.297
22 0 0 1 0 0 0 -0.020 0.284 -0.088 0.174
23 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.426 N.A. 0.211 N.A.
24 0 0 1 0 1 0 0.800 ** N.A. ** 0.881 ** N.A.
25 0 0 0 0 0 0
26 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.165 0.428 0.085 -0.138
27 0 0 0 0 1 0 -0.058 0.131 -0.029 0.077
28 0 1 0 1 0 0 0.381 N.A. -0.294 N.A.
29 0 1 0 1 0 1 0.309 -1.270 ** -0.027 -2.429 **
30 0 1 0 1 1 0 0.106 0.035 0.131 0.627
31 0 0 1 1 0 0 -0.231 -1.534 ** 0.083 1.770 **
32 0 0 1 1 0 1 0.211 0.611 ** 0.127 0.178
33 0 0 1 1 1 0 0.426 N.A. -0.009 N.A.
34 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.295 ** 0.424 * -0.007 0.348 **
35 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.462 ** 0.402 ** 0.084 * 0.114
36 0 0 0 1 1 0 0.600 ** 0.565 ** 0.150 ** 0.365
Reference group
grades 4 & 5 grade 6 grades 4 & 5 grade 6
period t-1 period t Reading Mathematics
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Table B-9 
Estimates effects of language programs on reading and mathematics test score gains by ELL 
status 
 
Notes:  All students in this sample took English version of the tests every period. 
 
  
Non-Exiters
Bilingual effect (12)-(16) 0.141 ** 0.280 ** -0.011 0.121
ESL effect (14)-(16) 0.061 0.136 0.003 0.069
Bilingual effect of one-period treatment (10)-(16) -0.013 -0.004 -0.094 -0.400
ESL effect of one-period treatment (13)-(16) -0.103 -0.317 -0.048 -0.115
Changing programs:  Bilingual-to-ESL effect (11)-(12) -0.166 ** -0.101 -0.096 ** -0.116
Changing programs:  Bilingual-to-Regular effect (10)-(12) -0.154 ** -0.284 -0.084 -0.521 **
Changing programs:  ESL-to-Bilingual effect (15)-(14) -0.009 -0.013 -0.014 0.027
Changing programs:  ESL-to-Regular effect (13)-(14) -0.164 ** -0.454 -0.051 -0.184
Exiters
Bilingual effect (3)-(7) -0.006 -0.177 0.049 -0.084
ESL effect (5)-(7) -0.032 0.846 ** -0.059 -0.968 **
Bilingual effect of one-period treatment (1)-(7) -0.026 0.055 -0.019 -0.172 **
ESL effect of one-period treatment (4)-(7) -0.040 ** 0.012 -0.006 -0.004
MathematicsReading
paths grade 4& 5 grade 6 grade 4& 5 grade 6
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Table B-10 
Effect of paths on standardized gains for students who took Spanish version of the test in grades 
3-5 
 
Notes:  ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10% 
 
 
 
Path lell lbil lesl ell bil esl
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0.157 0.550 -1.278 -1.858 **
2 1 1 0 0 0 1 -2.091 ** - ** -1.123 ** -
3 1 1 0 0 1 0 0.472 1.007 * -1.087 -1.071
4 1 0 1 0 0 0 3.522 ** - -1.066 -
5 1 0 1 0 0 1 - - - -
6 1 0 1 0 1 0 - - - -
7 1 0 0 0 0 0 -0.375 1.063 1.030 -
8 1 0 0 0 0 1 - - - -
9 1 0 0 0 1 0 -0.146 - -0.769 -
10 1 1 0 1 0 0 0.615 0.802 ** -1.096 -1.115
11 1 1 0 1 0 1 -0.322 0.297 -1.578 ** -1.640 **
12 1 1 0 1 1 0 0.363 0.332 -1.072 -1.209 **
13 1 0 1 1 0 0 - - - -
14 1 0 1 1 0 1 0.189 0.005 -1.161 -1.818 **
15 1 0 1 1 1 0 0.348 1.199 -1.549 ** -
16 1 0 0 1 0 0 0.448 0.449 - -
17 1 0 0 1 0 1 - - -2.038 ** -
18 1 0 0 1 1 0 0.534 -0.082 -1.181 -1.375
19 0 1 0 0 0 0 -0.616 -0.304 -1.511 ** -0.381
20 0 1 0 0 0 1 - - - -
21 0 1 0 0 1 0 1.973 ** - - -
22 0 0 1 0 0 0 - - - -
23 0 0 1 0 0 1 - - - -
24 0 0 1 0 1 0 - - - -
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
26 0 0 0 0 0 1 - - - -
27 0 0 0 0 1 0 2.222 ** -3.449 ** 0.459 -1.391 **
28 0 1 0 1 0 0 - - - -
29 0 1 0 1 0 1 - - - -
30 0 1 0 1 1 0 0.452 1.646 -0.556 -1.353
31 0 0 1 1 0 0 - - - -
32 0 0 1 1 0 1 -1.896 ** - - -
33 0 0 1 1 1 0 - - - -
34 0 0 0 1 0 0 -0.179 - -0.811 -
35 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.063 0.868 2.677 ** -1.918 **
36 0 0 0 1 1 0 0.359 0.108 -0.807 -2.388 **
period t-1 period t Reading Mathematics
grades 4 & 5 grade 6 grades 4 & 5 grade 6
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Table B-11 
Estimates effects of language programs on reading and mathematics test score gains by ELL 
status 
 
Notes:  All students in this sample took Spanish version of the tests in grades 3,4, and 5.  
grade 6
Non-Exiters
Changing programs:  Bilingual-to-ESL effect (11)-(12) -0.685 ** -0.035 -0.505 ** -0.430 **
Changing programs:  Bilingual-to-Regular effect (10)-(12) 0.252 0.471 ** -0.024 0.095
Changing programs:  ESL-to-Bilingual effect (15)-(14) 0.160 1.194 -0.388 -
Changing programs:  ESL-to-Regular effect (13)-(14) - - - -
Mathematics
grade 4& 5paths
Reading
grade 6grade 4& 5
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